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HALF-BAKED: THE DEMAND BY FOR-PROFIT 
BUSINESSES FOR RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 
FROM SELLING TO SAME-SEX COUPLES 
James M. Donovan∗ 
          Should bakers be required to make cakes for same-sex weddings? 
This Article unravels the eclectic arguments that are offered in support 
of a religious exemption from serving gay customers in the wake of 
Obergefell.  
          Preliminary issues first consider invocations of a libertarian 
right to exclude. Rather than being part of our concept of liberty, this 
right to exclude from commercial premises is a new rule devised to 
prevent African Americans from participating in free society. Instead of 
expanding this racist rule to likewise bar gays from the marketplace, it 
should be reset to the antebellum standard of free access to all public 
places of commerce. A second background strategy defends 
discrimination for conduct (like marriage) rather than status such as 
sexual orientation. This approach has found no positive reception in the 
courts because of the close relationship between same-sex marriage 
and the status of being homosexual.  
          The principle legal arguments consider first the free speech claim 
that cakes send unwilling messages of support for homosexuality. 
Although courts have rejected these defenses, the possibility of a 
coerced speech defense contextualized to the receiving audience and 
read against background social norms should be recognized. The 
marquee free exercise claim presents an even less likely chance of 
success, especially in states without a RFRA law. In jurisdictions that 
do have such a law, it is unclear how judges will assess the 
government’s compelling interest to prevent sexual orientation 
discrimination. That analysis will involve a description of the harms 
threatening both sides of the conflict. While the injuries arising from 
the violation of sincerely held religious beliefs are to be assumed, the 
dignitary harms to the same-sex couple should not be mischaracterized 
and trivialized as a “minor inconvenience.” 
∗ Director and James & Mary Lassiter Associate Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The religious right declared a culture war to preserve its 
dominance within American society,1 and to the surprise of many 
suffered major setbacks. A watershed moment arrived with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 which held that 
same-sex marriage was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.3 
With the failure of one of their lead agenda items, the best that 
opponents of marriage equality can now hope is to frustrate the 
exercise of this new constitutional rule. Almost immediately, county 
clerks were urged to defy the law by refusing to issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples,4 or to anyone at all in hopes of 
avoiding a charge of discrimination.5 Others have resigned en 
masse.6 
The rhetorical framework for this resistance was offered by 
Obergefell’s dissents. Justice Thomas, for example, expressed 
concerns about the impact of the decision’s “consequences for 
1. Patrick Buchanan, Culture War Speech: Address to the Republican National Convention,
VOICES OF DEMOCRACY (Aug. 17, 1992), http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/Buchanan-culture 
-war-speech-speech-text; Patrick Buchanan, The Cultural War for the Soul of America, PATRICK 
J. BUCHANAN—OFFICIAL WEBSITE (Sept. 14, 1992, 12:00 AM), http://buchanan.org/blog/the
-cultural-war-for-the-soul-of-america-149.
2. No. 14-556 (U.S. June 26, 2015).
3. Id. Other significant defeats included the failure to overturn “Obamacare,” the
Affordable Care Act. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (Affordable Care Act Section 
36B’s tax credits are available to individuals who purchase health insurance on an exchange 
created by the federal government); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012) (holding individual mandate in Affordable Care Act was a constitutionally permissible 
tax). 
4. Rep. Womick Asks County Clerks to Marry Only Couples That Include a Man and a
Woman, CHATTANOOGAN.COM (July 28, 2015), http://www.chattanoogan.com/2015/7/28/305071 
/Rep.-Womick-Asks-County-Clerks-To-Marry.aspx. 
5. Proposed Class Action at 2, Miller et al. v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (Aug. 12, 2015),
http://www.aclu-ky.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Rowan-complaint.pdf; Sean Moody, Group 
Rallies Behind Whitley Clerk’s Decision Not to Grant Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, WKYT 
NEWS (July 9, 2015, 10:12 PM), http://www.wkyt.com/home/headlines/Group-rallies-behind 
-Whitley-clerks-decision-not-to-grant-same-sex-marriage-licenses-312653641.html. The Supreme
Court of Ohio Board of Professional Conduct explicitly denies judges the options of both not
officiating for same-sex marriages, and refusing to perform any at all, reasoning that “[a] judge’s
decision to decline to perform some or all marriage ceremonies, when grounded on the judge’s
personal beliefs, may reflect adversely on perceptions regarding the judge’s performance of other
judicial duties.” Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Prof’l Conduct, Opinion Letter on Judicial
Performance of Civil Marriages of Same-Sex Couples (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.sc.ohio
.gov/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/2015/Op_15-001.pdf.
6. Heather Clark, Entire Staff of Tennessee County Clerk’s Office Resigns over Supreme
Court ‘Gay Marriage’ Ruling, CHRISTIAN NEWS NETWORK (July 5, 2015), http://christiannews 
.net/2015/07/05/entire-staff-of-tennessee-county-clerks-office-resigns-over-supreme-court-gay 
-marriage-ruling.
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religious liberty,”7 while Justice Alito bemoaned that with this 
decision “the majority facilitates the marginalization of the many 
Americans who have traditional ideas.”8 Chief Justice Roberts noted, 
“Today’s decision . . . creates serious questions about religious 
liberty. Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in 
ways that may be seen to conflict with the new right to same-sex 
marriage.”9 
The underlying reasoning appears to be that allowing same-sex 
couples to marry will infringe the religious freedoms of those who 
dislike such families. While some of the more hysterical rhetoric 
invoking fears of preachers forced to solemnize nuptials has led to 
the quick introduction and passage of so-called “Pastor Protection” 
acts,10 the more contentious controversy centers on whether, in the 
name of religion, for-profit businesses can refuse to serve gay men 
and lesbians, especially those planning a wedding ceremony.
The possibility of surging discrimination in the marketplace is 
not a mere hypothetical. In the hours after Obergefell was handed 
down, Ken Paxton, the Texas Attorney General, as part of his 
criticism of the opinion, moved immediately to these concerns: “The 
truth is that the debate over the issue of marriage has increasingly 
devolved into personal and economic aggression against people of 
faith who have sought to live their lives consistent with their 
sincerely-held religious beliefs about marriage . . . . We should 
ensure that people and businesses are not discriminated against by 
state and local governments based on a person’s religious beliefs.”11 
Governor Greg Abbott assured Texans that “[n]o Texan is required 
by the Supreme Court’s decision to act contrary to his or her 
religious beliefs regarding marriage.”12 A summary of the day’s 
reactions from conservatives shows the invocation of religious 
7. Obergefell, No. 14-556, slip op. at 16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 7 (Alito, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 28 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
10. TEXAS S.B. 2065 (2015). These acts confer no protections not already recognized under
the First Amendment. Churches have always been free to choose their own rituals. See Liz 
Crampton, Abbott Signs “Pastor Protection Act” into Law, THE TEX. TRIBUNE, June 11, 2015. 
11. Ken Paxton, Following High Court’s Flawed Ruling, Next Fight Is Religious Liberty,
ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX. (June 26, 2015), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/oagnews/release.php 
?id=5142. 
12. Greg Abbott, Statement on Supreme Court Ruling on Same-Sex Marriage, OFF.
GOVERNOR GREG ABBOTT (June 26, 2015), http://gov.texas.gov/news/press-release/21131. 
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accommodation of antigay positions to be a recurring theme.13 In a 
rhetorical turn that has become a signature move of the right, those 
who would wish to discriminate are now portrayed as innocent 
victims.14 
Numerous conflicts between couples and service providers have 
resulted in court decisions, administrative rulings, and popular 
attention in the blogosphere. The first such case, Elane Photography, 
anticipated the current furor by several years when an Albuquerque 
photographer refused to make her services available for a lesbian 
commitment ceremony.15 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that 
the refusal violated the state’s Human Rights Act and, most 
relevantly for the present discussion, that the application of the 
antidiscrimination statute did not violate the First Amendment rights 
of the photographer. 
Other instances soon followed: a Richland, Washington, florist 
withheld wedding flowers,16 while a Georgia print shop refused to 
print wedding invitations.17 In Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania, the local 
bridal shop refused to sell wedding dresses to a lesbian couple.18 
13. Sandy Fitzgerald, Bush, Carson, Walker: Protect Religious Liberty, State’s Rights,
NEWSMAX (June 26, 2015, 10:48 AM), http://www.newsmax.com/Headline/supreme-court-gay 
-marriage-reaction-bobby-jindal/2015/06/26/id/652373.
14. Cf. Jay Michaelson, Redefining Religious Liberty: The Covert Campaign Against Civil
Rights, POL. RES. ASSOCIATES 21 (2013), http://www.politicalresearch.org/wp-content/uploads 
/downloads/2013/04/PRA_Redefining-Religious-Liberty_March2013_PUBLISH .pdf. Today, the 
conservative “religious liberty” frame claims that the real victims are not gay students being 
bullied, women denied accessible health care, or nonreligious students coerced into participating 
in a religious ceremony. Conservative “religious liberty” rhetoric says that true victims are the 
university, the bully, the woman’s employer, and the graduation speaker who is not able to recite 
a prayer. Instead of a conflict between civil rights, this rhetoric focuses only on the rights of the 
person doing harm to another. 
15. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013).
16. Kelsey Harkness, State Says 70-Year-Old Flower Shop Owner Discriminated Against
Gay Couple. Here’s How She Responded, THE DAILY SIGNAL (Feb. 20, 2015), http://dailysignal 
.com/print/?post_id=177383; Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-02-00871-5 WL 
94248 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.adfmedia.org/files/ArlenesFlowersCapacity 
Ruling.pdf. 
17. Rebecca Lindstrom, Suwanee Business Refuses to Print Gay Wedding Invitation, 11
ALIVE (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.11alive.com/story/news/local/suwanee/2015/04/24/Suwanee 
-alphagraphics-franchise-gay-wedding/26318959.
18. David Ferguson, Pennsylvania Bridal Shop Won’t Sell Gowns to Lesbian Couple,
Sparking Backlash, RAW STORY (Aug. 8, 2014, 10:49 AM), http://www.rawstory.com/2014/08 
/pennsylvania-bridal-shop-wont-sell-gowns-to-lesbian-couple-sparking-backlash. A similar 
incident occurred in 2011 in New Jersey. Nina Terrero, N.J. Bridal Shop Refused to Sell Wedding 
Dress to Lesbian Bride: Owner Says: “That’s Illegal,” ABC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2011), http:// 
abcnews.go.com/US/nj-bridal-shop-refused-sell-wedding-dress-lesbian/story?id=14342333. 
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Wedding planners similarly have turned away same-sex couples,19 as 
have venues cited for declining to book gay couples.20 While 
churches are protected from suits demanding that they officiate at 
gay weddings, for-profit chapels may not share this immunity and 
have indeed attracted attention.21 
But the complaint most vivid within the popular imagination 
concerns bakers and wedding cakes. Throughout the nation, bakeries 
turn away same-sex couples seeking cakes for their ceremonies.22 A 
Portland, Oregon, bakery that refused service was ultimately forced 
to pay $135,000 in damages for emotional and mental suffering.23 
Similarly, a Denver, Colorado, shop that ceased making wedding 
cakes altogether rather than comply with an order to provide them 
19. Caitlin MacNeal, AZ Wedding Planner Denies Lesbian Couple: What About ‘My
Freedom’?, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Nov. 17, 2014, 11:39 AM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com 
/livewire/arizona-wedding-planner-refuses-gay-couple. 
20. Lina Batarags, Couple Fined $10,000 After Refusing to Host Same-Sex Marriage on
Their Farm, OPPOSING VIEWS (Oct. 4, 2014), https://www.opposingviews.com/i/religion/couple 
-fined-10000-after-refusing-host-same-sex-marriage-their-farm; Jean Ann Esselink, Restaurant
That Refused Gay Weddings Closing for Lack of Business, NEW C.R. MOVEMENT (June 24, 2015,
11:11 AM), http://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/uncucumbered/restaurant _that_refused
_gay_weddings_closing_for_lack_of_business?recruiter_id=17; Trudy Ring, In Settling Bias
Case, Wedding Venue to Pay for Couple’s Nuptials, THE ADVOCATE (Aug. 25, 2014, 3:24 PM),
http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/2014/08/25/settling-bias
-case-wedding-venue-pay-couples-nuptials. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United
Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 339 F. App’x 232 (3d Cir. 2009), denied access to a
beachfront property managed by a Methodist organization, but which was run as a public
accommodation.
21. David Badash, Almost Everything You’ve Been Told About the Idaho Wedding Chapel
Story Is a Lie, NEW C.R. MOVEMENT (Oct. 21, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://www.thenewcivilrights 
movement.com/davidbadash/how_many_lies_is_the_religious_right_willing_to_tell_in_the_idah
o_for_profit_wedding_chapel_story. 
22. A scheme to turn this pattern of requiring bakers to make cakes for gays on its head by
suing pro-gay bakers who refuse to make antigay cakes has failed. Peter Holley, Colorado Bakery 
That Refused to Bake Anti-Gay Cakes Did Not Discriminate, State Agency Says, WASH.  
POST (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/04/color 
ado-bakery-that-refused-to-bake-anti-gay-cakes-did-not-discriminate-state-agency-says; Jack v. 
Azucar Bakery Charge, No. P20140069X (Colo. Civil Rights Div. Mar. 25, 2015), 
http://perma.cc/5K6D-VV8U. 
23. In re Melissa Elaine Klein, Nos. 44-14 & 45-14, 2015 WL 4503460 (Or. Div. of Fin. &
Corp. Sec. July 2, 2015). The order awards the sizable penalty less for the refusal to bake the cake 
than for the subsequent “doxing” of the lesbian couple by the bakers and their ongoing push to 
publicize the complaint—exposing the couple to continual harassment and endangerment of their 
children. Libby Ann, Sweet Cakes by Melissa Didn’t Just Deny a Lesbian Couple Service, They 
Also Doxxed Them and Their Kids, PATHEOS (July 9, 2015), http://www.patheos.com 
/blogs/lovejoyfeminism/2015/07/sweet-cakes-by-melissa-didnt-just-deny-a-lesbian-couple 
-service-they-also-doxxed-them-and-their-kids.html. This distinction has been largely obscured
by the conservative blogs.
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for gay couples has also lost a court challenge.24 A third baker in 
Indiana denied a cake to a couple celebrating fourteen years together, 
although the shop has been willing to disregard its policies on other 
kinds of cakes regarding depictions of alcohol, drugs, and violence.25 
Saying she had first “talked to Jesus for two weeks,” a Schuylkill 
Haven, Pennsylvania, baker refused even to meet with the couple 
requesting her services.26 The more untempered speakers for the 
religious right have compared these conflicts over cakes with the 
Holocaust.27
These merchants share the belief that religion forbids their 
participation in an act they judge to be sinful.28 While that claim may 
suffice to generate media attention, the legal question is triggered not 
by the mere refusal of services, but by the exercise of that choice in a 
jurisdiction with a public accommodations antidiscrimination law 
that includes sexual orientation.29 Lacking a federal law of 
comparable scope,30 the flashpoints will continue to be scattered 
selectively throughout the nation, centering on the twenty-one states 
24. Colorado Baker Must Make Cakes for Gay Wedding, Panel Rules, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(May 30, 2014, 3:25 PM), www.nydailynews.com/life-style/colorado-baker-cakes-gay-weddings 
-panel-rules-article-1.1811676 (affirming the administrative decision that the baker’s refusal to
sell a wedding cake violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act).
25. Tom Boggioni, Indiana Bakery Refuses to Make Gay Commitment Cake, Exception
Made for Gun Cake, RAW STORY (Mar. 14, 2014, 1:41 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/2014 
/03/indiana-bakery-refuses-to-make-gay-commitment-cake-exception-made-for-gun-cake. 
26. Zack Ford, Pennsylvania Bakery Latest to Refuse Service to Same-Sex Couple,
THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 14, 2014, 1:12 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2014/08/14/3471220 
/pennsylvania-bakery-discrimination. 
27. Travis Gettys, Tony Perkins: Christians Forced to Bake Cakes for Gays Like Forcing
Jews into Nazi Ovens, RAW STORY (June 6, 2014), www.rawstory.com/rs/2014/06/06/tony 
-perkins-christians-forced-to-bake-cakes-for-gays-like-forcing-jews-into-nazi-ovens; Charles J.
Dean, Alabama Chief Justice Moore: Gay Marriage ‘Not in Accordance with Constitution’,
AL.COM (June 30, 2015, 6:44 PM), http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/06/Alabama
_chief_justice_moore_ga.html (“Could I do this if I were in Nuremberg [war crimes trials after
WWII] say that I was following the orders of the highest authority to kill Jews? . . . Could I say I
was ordered to do so?” When told that trial was about killing human beings, not gay marriage,
Moore asked, “Is there a difference?”).
28. Although we will take these claims on their face as offered in good faith, we can observe
the selectivity of their objection. In the religious tradition to which most of these defendants 
belong, divorce and other acts are equally sinful, yet no record exists of resistance to participating 
in marriage rituals of these other sinful persons. 
29. Earlier cases were also strengthened if the service withholding occurred in jurisdictions
that recognized same-sex marriages. Since Obergefell applies to all localities, only a sufficiently 
expansive antidiscrimination law could serve to trigger future complaints.” 
30. A federal nondiscrimination bill, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015), was introduced on July
23, 2015. Its prospects for passage in the current Congress, however, are not favorable. 
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and the multiple municipalities that have included sexual orientation 
within their public accommodations statutes.31 
The prototypes for such laws are those that forbid racial 
discrimination in public accommodations. These antidiscrimination 
laws arose in American society as a response to its brutal history of 
slavery and subsequent racial segregation. Although designed to 
correct an intolerable situation in which citizens were blocked from 
full participation in community life, these equal access measures 
possess an inherent tension with other deeply-held values. 
The antidiscrimination project represents a claim of 
enormous moral power: the demand that society recognize 
the human worth of all its members, that no person 
arbitrarily be despised or devalued. Yet as soon as we begin 
to try to carry it out, we find ourselves in collision 
with other moral considerations, equally powerful, 
that demand that the project be a limited one: social 
order, efficiency, communal solidarity, individual 
liberty . . . . [A]cknowledging that it would be terrible if 
government were to pursue the antidiscrimination project  
single-mindedly, we must also acknowledge how terrible it 
would be if government did not pursue it at all.32 
The result is that even those who would oppose discrimination 
in the public square as a jurisprudential matter cannot reject the 
claim out of hand. Not, at least, without first weighing the competing 
interests and countervailing rights. How strong is this right to 
exclude whole groups of others to whom one has religious objections 
(gays today, very likely Muslims tomorrow,33 and Jews34 and 
31. Lists of jurisdictions with antidiscrimination laws that include sexual orientation as a
protected class are maintained online. See List of Cities and Counties in the United States 
Offering an LGBT Non-Discrimination Ordinance, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wik 
i/List_of_cities_and_counties_in_the_United_States_offering_an_LGBT_non-discrimination 
_ordinance (last visited Oct. 9, 2015); Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information Map, 
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
32. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 10 (1996)
[hereinafter ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW]. 
33. Abby Ohlheiser, A Florida Gun Range Owner Has Declared a ‘Muslim-Free Zone,’
WASH. POST (July 21, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/07/21 
/a-florida-gun-range-owner-has-declared-a-muslim-free-zone; Brianna Bailey, Oklahoma 
Survival Store Says Muslims Not Welcome, NEWSOK (Aug. 13, 2015, 3:26 PM), http://newsok 
.com/article/5439970. 
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Catholics35 in the past)? If such a right to exclude does exist, how 
does it rank against the rights of others to participate in social and 
economic life on an equal and respectful basis? 
Andrew Koppelman suggests that these claims to discriminate 
do not merit deference, but not because they are trumped by other 
rights. Rather, they are inconsistent with the basis on which the 
demand has been asserted in the first place: 
The justification for antidiscrimination law is that certain 
preferences are so malign that they contradict the whole 
point of counting preferences in the first place. We respect 
choices only because we respect people, and therefore we 
are justified in disregarding choices when such choices 
manifest and reinforce disrespect for people.36 
In other words, claiming a right to discriminate carries weight only to 
the extent society recognizes the individual’s worth as a person 
deserving dignified respect. An asserted privilege that disregards 
respect for others leaves the appeal without a philosophical 
foundation.37 
Those asserting the claim, however, may believe they hold a 
trump in that their need to exclude flows from their sectarian beliefs, 
which are granted high deference in our constitutional system. 
Despite this presumptive position of strength, these claimants should 
still lose. Even granting the sincerity of the conflict between 
religious belief and public duty, the governmental interest in assuring 
a free marketplace is sufficiently high to rule out tolerating a 
weakening of confidence in open trade by allowing a potentially 
34. A Sensation at Saratoga, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 1877), http://query.nytimes.com/mem
/archive-free/pdf?res=9802EFD6123FE63BBC4152DFB066838C669FDE. 
35. Adoption Agency Rejects Catholic Parents, USA TODAY (July 16, 2005), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-07-16-adopt-catholics_x.htm. Under public pressure, 
the adoption agency later changed its policy. Christian Adoption Agency Will Allow Catholics, 
WND [WORLDNETDAILY] (July 22, 2005, 1:00 AM), http://www.wnd.com/2005 /07/31416. 
36. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW, supra note 32, at 31.
37. This same inconsistence offers an adequate response to another common rhetorical ploy
in these debates. When opposed for their intolerance, discriminators reply that their critics are 
hypocrites for not tolerating their intolerance. But Karl Popper dispelled this “paradox of 
tolerance”: 
If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not 
prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the 
tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them . . . . We should therefore claim, in 
the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. 
1 KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES: THE SPELL OF PLATO 265 n.4 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD 1952). 
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limitless and idiosyncratic exemption from general law. Against that 
background, the balancing of interests in most cases will find that the 
plaintiff’s burden is the lesser than what would be imposed upon the 
gay couple. Let there be cake. 
The discussion begins with Part I dispensing with two 
preliminary arguments often lurking behind claims for a religious 
exemption from nondiscrimination laws. First, a common 
assumption is that the business is private property from which the 
owner has a perfect right to exclude anyone he or she desires, and for 
any reason. Although framed as a self-evident conclusion from 
property rights, this position, in fact, misrepresents the understanding 
of property rights at the time of our nation’s founding, and thus is not 
woven into our fundamental concepts of liberty. Moreover, to the 
extent such statements reflect the current principles of property law, 
these came into existence specifically in the years after the Civil War 
so as to enable businesses to exclude racial minorities from their 
premises. Those who assert a property right to exclude—a power that 
should be protected against interference by antidiscrimination laws—
are seeking the protection of an overtly racist principle, and the 
demand should be evaluated in that light. 
A second background premise is invoked largely to mitigate the 
scope of the exemption sought. Rather than seeking a sweeping 
exclusion of all gay people, the defendants profess an antipathy only 
toward gay couples seeking to marry. This argument fails for two 
reasons, one practical and the other conceptual. The pragmatic 
observation is that those asserting the claim are unable to point to 
any of their own practices that support this description of their actual 
business conduct. The problem edges into the abstract concession 
that it is not intelligible to claim to tolerate gay people but only so 
long as they are not behaving “gaily.” To reject a gay couple 
exercising the mature fulfillment of their personal identities by 
seeking to make a lifelong and loving commitment is to reject gay 
people in just the same way as one cannot claim to tolerate Catholics 
but only so long as they never attend mass. Because there is no 
meaningful way to both respect the gay individual while also 
discriminating against gay couples, the present argument will treat 
the desired exemption as targeting all gay persons despite its current 
framing as concerning only those in relationships. 
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Although glossed as a dispute involving religious exercise 
rights, the formal legal complaints invariably include a free speech 
claim. Part II outlines the argument that when merchants are forced 
to provide services to same-sex weddings, those actions constitute 
coerced speech in support of homosexuality. Uniformly rejected 
when considered by the courts, the assertion may be failing because 
it has not been properly argued. Whether actions signal messages 
depends on the background normative expectations about what is 
proper. Catering a gay wedding sends no particular message when 
the environment renders such occasions uncontroversial. In settings 
where homosexuals are still an object of disparagement, however, 
catering would send a message of support. Full consideration of the 
coerced speech argument, then, should identify the relevant standard 
of comparison and then ascertain the prevailing norms within that 
group. 
Part III sketches free exercise jurisprudential trends from 
Reynolds to Hobby Lobby. Two different standards of review exist. 
For states without a RFRA statute, the rule is that of Smith, which 
holds that no exemption is required from neutral laws of general 
applicability. Suits involving federal laws, and those in states with 
RFRA laws, will apply the compelling interest test of Sherbert and 
Yoder. Thus far, litigated cases involving merchants seeking 
an exemption to discriminate against gay couples have been in 
non-RFRA states. Because nondiscrimination laws are neutral in 
their scope, these merchants will invariably lose their free exercise 
complaints. As a first attempt to anticipate how a court might treat 
such a case in a jurisdiction applying the compelling interest test, 
Part IV lays out the respective burdens such an exemption, or lack 
thereof, would impose upon each of the parties. Part V weighs the 
competing injuries to identify who is more likely to prevail. 
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Although often framed as a question of religious liberty, the full 
statement of the case for exemptions includes two other premises 
with varying degrees of explicitness. The first is the assertion that the 
business is the private property of the owner, and thus he or she has 
an absolute right to decide who can enter. The suggestion that 
anyone else holds a superior right of access violates this fundamental 
liberty claim. The simple belief, that because this is my property I 
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have a right to restrict access if I choose, may be offered as a 
self-evident truth about a free society: if you don’t control your own 
property, in what way can you claim to be “free”? 
This section shows that this account of the right to exclude is an 
error—an absolute right to exclude is not an original part of the 
American understanding of the attached rights of private property, 
and thus it is not rooted in our inherited concept of freedom and 
fundamental liberty. The claimed right is neither natural nor 
inevitable, weakening the demand that storeowners should be able to 
refuse access to gay men and lesbians. Moreover, to the extent that 
the claim does capture the current strains of property law, it is 
because of the adoption of Jim Crow laws designed to grant a new 
right to exclude African Americans where no such power had existed 
before. Although couched as an uncontroversial and traditional 
description of what it means to own property, the touted right to 
exclude is a modern invention overtly crafted to allow businessmen 
to refuse service to former slaves. The merit of this defense should 
be judged from that perspective. 
The second undercurrent anticipates a criticism of the 
sought-after exemption—that it is broader than it needs to be and is 
likely to lead to discrimination against entire swaths of the public on 
any number of attributes. A religious right to exclude gays will be 
functionally indistinguishable from a religious right to exclude 
women, African Americans, or Jews. A more limited right to exclude 
may receive more favorable consideration, and thus many 
proponents stress that the target is not gay men and lesbians per se, 
but only those in relationships, and especially those in lawful 
marriages. To a certain extent, this argument is perverse. For years 
the religious right criticized homosexuals for being promiscuous and 
unable to establish stable relationships; now these same 
conservatives say they will happily accept sexually active but single 
gays but are resolute in their wish to ostracize committed couples.38 
38. See Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious Exemption from Antidiscrimination Laws
in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions for Those Who Discriminate Against 
Marriage or Marrying Gays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 197 (2012) (“The idea of 
discriminating against committed, recognized relationships, as opposed to uncommitted, 
potentially transient ones, is bizarre.”). One possible explanation is offered by KENJI YOSHINO, 
COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 90 (2007) (“What is galling [to 
conservatives] is to see a gay couple demonstrate that their relationship works, that they are 
happy.”). 
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This argument, however, presumes that a clear line can be drawn 
between the status of being gay and the conduct of being in a gay 
relationship. This section will review the weaknesses of that 
viewpoint, both psychologically and legally. 
A. The Right to Exclude
Appeal to an absolute right to exclude can be critiqued on both 
descriptive and normative grounds. To the extent such a right is 
offered as flowing naturally and inevitably from the idea of private 
property and was the dominant understanding at our nation’s 
founding, that account is descriptively inaccurate. If the claim’s 
validity is not self-evident, the speaker then bears a burden to defend 
this asserted right. Even assuming that this hurdle can be 
successfully managed, the outcome still lacks the rhetorical power of 
a reliance on a fundamental principle of reasoned jurisprudence. 
Claimants are on stronger ground when they characterize the 
right as a rough summary of the current default rule of property law. 
But to the extent such a rule exists, it owes its rise not to the logic of 
property but to the post-Civil War frenzy to exclude African 
Americans from public accommodations. The rule, in other words, 
comes explicitly from our racist past, not our liberty understanding 
of property. As such it serves as a dubious and tainted foundation 
upon which to base a freedom to exclude gays. 
Although descriptively inaccurate, the right to exclude is not 
asserted cynically. While the rule is inherently racist, the speakers 
rarely intend it that way and may be surprised to learn the actual 
histories of their beliefs. We should instead assume most advocates 
genuinely believe that such a right exists, and that it is normatively 
good that such a right exists. Any effective reply to this conviction 
must therefore offer some insight into this phenomenological aspect 
to the appeal, and show why it, too, does not support the desired 
conclusion. 
1. Racist Lineage of the Right to Exclude
Bundled in with the religious liberty claim to discriminate 
against gay couples is an appeal to the free association right to 
exclude. The rhetorical work this claim is intended to perform is to 
effect a burden shift: Because I have a right to exclude anyone I wish 
from my business premises, I do not have to defend a choice to 
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exclude gays; the burden is on you to show why my property rights 
should be abrogated. The speaker implies a rightness about this 
arrangement such that to invoke its authority is not simply to seek 
shelter in an arbitrary rule, but rather to rely upon a set of 
relationships that approach the moral correctness of natural law39: I 
can exclude not because the law presently tells me I can, but because 
that is what it means to own property, and to say otherwise is to 
attack this fundamental precondition for liberty. In this, the asserted 
right to exclude serves the same intended function as the “time 
immemorial” appeals against same-sex marriage. Given such an 
unchallenged status quo, what could possibly be sufficient reason to 
disturb the established order? 
This strategy, however, fails for two reasons. First, it does not 
have roots in the property rules of our nation’s founding and thus 
lacks the expected common sense inevitability flowing from what it 
means to own “property.” Second, to the extent that it is an accurate 
description of the current rule, it is a late development specifically 
fashioned to advance racial segregation. According to the present 
position of legal historians, “the idea that property entails an absolute 
right to discriminate is not embedded in the common law from time 
immemorial but is an artifact of the Jim Crow era.”40 That would not 
be itself a sufficient basis to reject such a rule, but those claiming its 
benefits must recognize its tainted history and racist intent, and 
decide for themselves whether that is the banner under which they 
wish to wage this battle. 
The right to exclude survived the Civil Rights era perhaps 
because the main goal of the rules was mooted by federal 
antidiscrimination legislation. It was rarely invoked thereafter in any 
consistent manner. Its resurrection to target gay men and lesbians 
should motivate a push to remove this lingering vestige of Jim Crow, 
and return us to the rule of free access that prevailed before the Civil 
War. 
39. Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of Natural Law of Property, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 367
(1991) (“Insofar as the right to acquire or possess property was embedded by reason in the 
common law or natural law, there was little need to create additional parchment protections.”). 
40. ANDREW KOPPELMAN WITH TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO
DISCRIMINATE?: HOW THE CASE OF Boy Scouts of America v. James Dale WARPED THE LAW OF 
FREE ASSOCIATION 3 (2009). 
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a. Antebellum property rights
Most readers will find uncontroversial a claim that a core 
meaning of owning property includes a right to exert control over it, 
and that this extends to a right to exclude others from its use. This 
prerogative has, in fact, been singled out “as the most significant 
right held by an owner.”41 Some go even farther, saying that the right 
to exclude is not merely one among other attributes of owning 
property, it is synonymous with the idea of ownership itself: “[T]he 
right to exclude others is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ 
constituents of property—it is the sine qua non.”42 
The right to exclude is strongest in the context of private 
property, or property such as one’s home that is used and controlled 
for personal purposes. More contentious is the extent to which the 
right applies to commercial property when an owner has issued a 
general invitation to the public to enter the premises in order to 
conduct business. Does the owner still possess an unfettered right to 
exclude the person at the door based upon irrelevant group attributes 
such as race, sex, disability, or sexual orientation?43 This asserted 
power becomes even more contentious when the offending attributes 
are protected in antidiscrimination laws. 
The most explicit articulation of an unlimited right to exclude 
comes from libertarian political principles, which draw upon two 
different premises. First, libertarians hold the right to private 
property in the highest regard, and second, they express great 
skepticism concerning any governmental regulation, but especially 
those that would curtail property rights. In this view public 
accommodations antidiscrimination laws present just such an attack 
on private property, leading libertarians such as Senator Rand Paul to 
view the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a mistaken intrusion.44 
The philosophical infrastructure for these libertarian positions 
builds upon the writings of John Locke. The starting point for 
41. SIMON DOUGLAS & BEN MCFARLANE, DEFINING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 219, 223–24 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds., 2013). 
42. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998).
43. Even those who would deny a right to exclude based upon group attributes would tend to
recognize a right to exclude specific individuals based upon individualized qualities, such as prior 
bad behavior. 
44. Rand Paul on ‘Maddow’ Defends Criticism of Civil Rights Act, Says He Would Have
Worked to Change Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 4:30 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2010/05/20/rand-paul-tells-maddow-th_n_582872.html. 
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Locke’s philosophy is first that “every man has a property in his own 
person.”45 This principle is today formally expanded to clarify that 
individuals inherently enjoy “full self-ownership,” defined as 
consisting: 
[O]f a full set of the following ownership rights: (1) control
rights over the use of the entity: both a liberty-right to use it
and a claim-right that others not use it, (2) rights to
compensation if someone uses the entity without one’s
permission, (3) enforcement rights (e.g., rights of prior
restraint if someone is about to violate these rights),
(4) rights to transfer these rights to others (by sale, rental,
gift, or loan), and (5) immunities to the non-consensual loss
of these rights. Full ownership is simply a logically
strongest set of ownership rights over a thing.46
This suite of rights occurs most clearly in the person’s
ownership of his own body.47 From this initial condition Locke 
explains how such a fully self-owned person can create “property” 
by mingling the exertions of his self-owned body’s labor with the 
natural external world: 
The labour of his body, and the work of his hands we may 
say are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of 
the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath 
mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his 
own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him 
removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath 
45. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil
Blackwell 1976). 
46. Peter Vallentyne & Bas van der Vossen, Libertarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(Sept. 5, 2002), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/libertarianism. 
47. Locke’s depiction of our property interest in our own bodies as a natural endowment can
be contrasted with Hegel’s account in which ownership of one’s self is an uncertain 
accomplishment: “it is only through the development [Ausbildung] of his own body and spirit, 
essentially by means of his self-consciousness comprehending itself as free, that he takes 
possession of himself and becomes his own property as distinct from that of others.” G.W.F. 
HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 57 (Allan W. Wood ed., 1st ed. 1991). 
Although Locke’s approach is more democratic in assigning ownership of one’s self, Hegel’s 
provides a better foundation for the value-added theory of property. In Hegel, the creation of 
ownership via labor is present from the beginning, making its application to the external world an 
organic extension needing no special argument; for Locke it comes in later as a separate species 
of ownership wholly dissimilar to the natural ownership that preceded it. 
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by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the 
common right of other men.48 
Under this value-added theory of property, a person owns her 
fruits because she first owns herself and by mixing her owned self 
with the external world she comes to own that piece to an equal 
extent. No one can have those claims infringed without 
compensation or preferably permission any more than one person 
can exert ownership over another.49 
Whatever the technical weaknesses of such a model, it possesses 
an intuitive appeal and can be readily grasped by most people. We 
are, in truth, naturally inclined to claim as “mine,” and to defend 
against incursions with vigor.50 In this light the insistence that 
business owners must open their stores to everyone—African 
Americans, gays, women, or whatever—arguably offends the basic 
fabric of ordered society. 
Despite such natural intelligibility, the fact is that our received 
common law recognized a quite different arrangement between 
merchants and the general public. This alternative history belies the 
implied argument that an absolute right to exclude is the 
uncontroversially American default against which those who would 
require free and nondiscriminatory access must inevitably crash. 
The original rule of the law of access to commercial property 
has been summarized by Joseph Singer. He concludes his deep 
historical review of the common law rule with the observation that 
the best evidence supports the view that “before the Civil War, the 
law probably required all businesses that held themselves out as open 
to the public to serve anyone who sought service.”51 The threshold 
for public access was the advertising of services and solicitation of 
customers in an indiscriminate manner. He reads Blackstone’s 
discussion of the duties of “common callings” in the manner of 
contracts with the advertised services being the offer, and the 
customer appearing as acceptance: “In effect, Blackstone treated the 
48. LOCKE, supra note 45, at § 27.
49. This brief summary admittedly oversimplifies the varied forms that libertarianism can
assume, but it serves to sketch the main principles driving the current argument concerning 
services to gay persons. 
50. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 288 (1990) (“[T]he
instinct of ownership is fundamental in man’s nature.”). 
51. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1292 (1996) [hereinafter No Right to Exclude]. 
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act of hanging out a sign as an invitation to come on the premises to 
do business of a certain kind, the act of stepping inside and offering 
money as an acceptance, and the refusal to do business as a breach of 
contract.”52 He finds a similar implied contract for common carriers 
in Parson’s 1853 Law of Contracts.53 In all such treatises and cases54 
summarizing the common law understanding in the antebellum 
years, it is the “holding out” that determines one’s duties. While later 
times would devise different theories to justify the demand on 
innkeepers and common carriers such as monopoly and license, 
Singer is adamant that “none of the antebellum cases bases the duty 
to serve” on such special circumstances.55 
Underscoring the complexity of the legal record, Singer 
summarizes his research: 
[T]he most plausible construction of antebellum legal
materials would extend the right of access to all businesses
that hold themselves out as ready to serve the public.
Moreover, the formal law exempting businesses other than
inns and common carriers from the duty to serve did not
come into being until the late 1850’s. In other words, the
current common-law rule did not crystallize until around the
Civil War.56
The best evidence, therefore, supports an expectation of equal 
treatment in the public square by merchants advertising their services 
as available to all, and this had become the general understanding. 
“At common law before the Civil War, every business that held itself 
out as open to serve the public arguably had a legal obligation to 
serve anyone who sought service.”57 
The main point to be drawn from this historical overview is that 
those who characterize the contemporary insistence that merchants 
treat gay people with respect as governmental overreach into the 
sacred foundations of our national founding are gesturing toward a 
52. Id. at 1310.
53. Id. at 1314.
54. E.g., Markham v. Brown, 8 N.H. 523, 528 (1837) (“An innkeeper holds out his house as
a public place to which travellers may resort, and of course surrenders some of the rights which 
he would otherwise have over it. Holding it out as a place of accommodation for travellers, he 
cannot prohibit persons who come under that character, in a proper manner, and at suitable times, 
from entering, so long as he has the means of accommodation for them.”). 
55. No Right to Exclude, supra note 51, at 1319.
56. Id. at 1331.
57. KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 40, at 5.
2016] SELLING TO SAME-SEX COUPLES 57 
mythic period that never existed. Even extending into the initial 
years after the Civil War, the U.S. Supreme Court: 
[D]id not identify the private realm as coextensive with the
realm of private property: property could be privately
owned and yet be part of the public sphere. Thus, for
example, the Court held that businesses’ constitutional
immunity from regulation was attenuated if the business
was “affected with a public interest.” More to the point, the
Court observed in the Civil Rights Cases that innkeepers
had a common-law duty to serve all who sought to
patronize them, regardless of race.58
In the words of one renowned economist, “Property rights are
not private.”59 The right to exclude in the commercial context was 
not part of our nation’s background legal understanding. Such a right 
is neither inevitable, traditional, nor uncontroversial. Those claiming 
this privilege bear the burden to argue why, in an environment of 
growing equality in the public square, they should be allowed to 
discriminate. A simple assertion that “It’s my property” will no 
longer suffice. 
b. Rise of the current rule
While lacking the imprimatur of logical inevitability or 
traditional practice, the right to exclude invoked by antigay business 
owners does approximate the current rule. As part of his sweeping 
review Singer found that, with few exceptions such as innkeepers 
and common carriers, business owners today in almost all 
jurisdictions enjoy the presumption that they “have the right to 
exclude non-owners unless that right is limited by statute.”60 On first 
blush this means that stores seeking to exclude gay couples would 
appear to be on strong footing so long as they are not covered by 
nondiscrimination statutes extending protections to sexual 
orientation. 
While this concession may offer some practical assistance to 
those intending to discriminate, the background of this change should 
preclude believing both that one can invoke this rule to restrict 
access while also viewing oneself a moral citizen. Concisely framed 
58. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW, supra note 32, at 188.
59. ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 324 (1977) (citation omitted).
60. No Right to Exclude, supra note 51, at 1290.
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by Koppelman, “The libertarian right to exclude . . . is racist at the 
core.”61 The racist associations of the practice are not an accidental 
consequence of a rule devised for a different purpose; rather its only 
goal was to empower one group to dominate and marginalize 
another. 
While Mississippi is presently the only state with a state law 
expressly granting business owners the absolute right to exclude that 
libertarians would extend to all commercial property owners,62 in 
practice most states do employ some version of this rule. In seeking 
to explain this shift, Singer notes that “the replacement of a general 
right of access with a general right to exclude redistributed property 
rights [from the public to the private property owner] in order to 
promote a racial caste system.”63 Unlike his reading of the pre-Civil 
War law, in this instance the facts are clear: “The case law that 
emerged after 1865 is absolutely consistent in affirming a 
common-law right of access to places of public accommodation 
without regard to race until the time of the Jim Crow laws of the 
1890s.”64 
The details Singer offers suggest the dynamic that played out 
between the postwar efforts to extend civil liberties to the newly 
freed slaves, and the entrenched southern majorities that sought new 
ways to limit African Americans in their ability to exercise their new 
condition. For example, “Tennessee and Delaware responded to the 
federal public accommodations act of 1875 by passing state laws 
affirming the power of places of public accommodation to choose 
their customers as they wished. South Carolina repealed its public 
accommodations law in 1889, effectively leaving businesses the 
power to choose their customers.”65 The end result, however, went 
much further. Rather than allowing white merchants to decide for 
themselves whether to serve black customers, when all was said and 
done that option was removed. By “1900 every state in the former 
61. KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 40, at 6.
62. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-23-17 (2011) (“Every person, firm or corporation engaged in
any public business . . . is hereby authorized and empowered to choose or select the person or 
persons he or it desires to do business with, and is further authorized and empowered to refuse to 
sell to, wait upon or serve any person that the owner, manager or employee of such public place 
of business does not desire to sell to, wait upon or serve.”). 
63. No Right to Exclude, supra note 51, at 1295.
64. Id. at 1357.
65. Id. at 1386.
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Confederacy, as well as Kentucky, had adopted new statutes 
instituting the Jim Crow policy of forced racial segregation in public 
accommodations, validated by Plessy v. Ferguson[66] in 1896.”67 
From a prior practice where anyone, including blacks, could go into 
any store and expect to be served, by the turn of the century racial 
segregation had become the legal requirement. 
This reversal was not without its own philosophical tensions. On 
the one hand, the era saw “increasing protections for property rights 
as well as a narrowing of the duty to serve” which might support a 
version of the change as being about the increased sensitivity to the 
entailments of property ownership.68 But an alternative reading takes 
fuller account of the available facts. This was also: 
[T]he Jim Crow era when the courts found valid substantial
regulations of property designed to promote racial
segregation. Although the narrowing of public
accommodations law appears, on the surface, to cohere with
emerging protections for property owners [e.g., in Lochner],
the inconsistency between property rights as conceived in
this period and Jim Crow statutes suggests that changes in
public accommodations law are far more tied to racial
politics than to laissez-faire philosophy or the protection of
property from government regulation.69
In sum, “white Americans were willing to suffer intrusions on
property rights in order to maintain white supremacy.”70 
This historical finding that the claimed right to exclude in the 
context of commercial properties is a recent innovation designed 
wholly to effectuate the exclusion of African Americans, and is not, 
as some might today believe, a neutral statement about the meanings 
of property ownership, alters the dynamics of an appeal to property 
rights as a rebuttal to nondiscrimination requirements. Even as a 
summary of the current rule the right to exclude is not absolute and 
thus any characterization otherwise misstates the facts. 
Antidiscrimination laws exist primarily to supersede the alleged 
superior right of property owners in the public marketplace to 
66. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
67. No Right to Exclude, supra note 51, at 1388.
68. Id. at 1395.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1389–90.
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exclude others on irrelevant and protected criteria. Racial 
discrimination is prohibited everywhere. The existence of laws 
against discrimination by race has already dispelled the popular 
libertarian characterization of property rights, and thus the “absolute” 
right exists nowhere absolutely. Some libertarians are frank about 
this tension between property rights and discrimination, and often 
side with allowing discrimination. This is why “Senator Rand Paul 
famously said on the Rachel Maddow Show that civil rights laws are 
problematic because they impinge on both the property rights and the 
free speech rights of owners.”71 Given these exceptions, the only 
question is the extent to which commercial property owners should 
be further required to serve those who present themselves in response 
to their public solicitations. 
2. Philosophical Difficulties in a Right to Exclude
The asserted right to exclude lacks roots in our constitutional 
founding and emerged only as a proxy for slavery so as to maintain 
domination over African Americans after the Confederacy lost the 
Civil War. Some might read these facts as missing the point from the 
perspective of supporters of a right to exclude. To argue that the 
historical presumptions about the right are wrong too easily 
dismisses the sincere commitment many feel toward this viewpoint. 
Correcting the background details will rarely respond to the 
subjective motivations of those invoking this right, however 
misunderstood it may be. Due to the frequent rhetorical and 
emotional reliance by antigay activists on the right to exclude, we 
should briefly consider the argument from their perspective. 
We have every reason to believe that these advocates of the right 
are earnest and sincere in the conviction that such a right exists, and 
that great stakes are at risk from what they see as a direct attack on a 
fundamental liberty. Given that description, the endowment effect 
alone predicts many of the dynamics of the present debate. The 
endowment effect is an empirical observation that “people seem to 
attach additional value to things they own simply because they 
71. Joseph William Singer, We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations and
the Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929, 933 (2015) [hereinafter We Don’t Serve Your Kind 
Here]. 
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belong to them.”72 The perceived loss “looms larger” than the gains 
someone else might realize from obtaining that same good which 
they currently do not own. This outcome offers “a rejection of one of 
the fundamental assumptions in standard economics, namely the 
assumption that preferences are independent from endowments [e.g., 
the Coase theorem],”73 and is “among the best known findings in 
behavioral economics.”74 The endowment effect suggests not only 
that the property owners will value the right to exclude more because 
they already have it, but also that in the utilitarian calculus 
infringement of the right will be more costly to them than any gains 
enjoyed by gay couples. 
Recognizing the threat that merchants perceive pertaining to the 
possible loss of a valued privilege does not, however, mean that 
asserting the existence of the right gets supporters very far. The 
implied argument, fleshed out, follows something along these lines: I 
own this property, which means I have a right to exclude others from 
its use; I wish to exclude gays, and therefore excluding gays is my 
moral prerogative—to say otherwise constitutes an affront to the 
fabric of society. A legal claim about property exclusions transmutes 
into a confrontation of moral worldviews. 
Most recognize this slide from statements of facts into 
conclusions about morality to be a form of the naturalistic fallacy. 
While the philosophical debate continues on the ability to move from 
empirical observations to ethical statements (notable skeptics include 
Hume,75 Moore,76 and Popper77), the general thrust is that unlike 
classic syllogisms, no necessary relationship exists between the 
72. Keith M. Marzilli Ericson & Andreas Fuster, The Endowment Effect, 6 ANN. REV. ECON.
555, 556 (2014). 
73. Id. at 559.
74. Id. at 555.
75. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford at
the Clarendon Press 1896) (“For as this ought or ought not, expresses some new relation or 
affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a 
reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a 
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.”). 
76. G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 10 (1962) (“It may be true that all things which are
good are also something else . . . . And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what those 
other properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have 
thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these 
properties, in fact, were simply not “other,” but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. 
This view I propose to call the “naturalistic fallacy” and of it I shall now endeavor to dispose.”). 
77. POPPER, supra note 37, at 64 (“To sum up, it is impossible to derive a sentence stating a
norm or a decision or, say, a proposal for a policy from a sentence stating a fact.”). 
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factual premises and the ethical conclusions. The claim that a right to 
exclude is a traditional “stick” in the “bundle” of property rights 
supports equally the moral claims that things should stay this way 
(the intended conclusion) and its opposite, that change is overdue. 
The only way to avoid arbitrarily favoring one direction over the 
other is to plump the argument with additional premises which tend 
to include the conclusion in the premises. This strategy, however, 
renders the assertion less an argument intended to persuade and more 
a polemic to rally the like-minded.78 
In the end, the dispute centers on one’s concept of property. If 
one holds with libertarians that property constitutes an irreducible 
fundamental fact of healthy human living, one will tend to favor the 
rights of merchants to discriminate against anyone they choose, for 
whatever reason. If, however, one believes that property is the 
creature of the law—one owns something only when the law is 
prepared to defend interests against third parties—then “property 
rights are created by the law for reasons and should not be defined in 
a way inconsistent with those reasons.”79 The social commitment to 
democratic equality is at least as deep as that to private property, and 
accordingly a simple appeal to ownership, even when earnest and 
heartfelt, should not be sufficient to explain or justify broad 
discrimination against whole segments of the citizenry. 
B. Scope of Desired Exemption
A small pizzeria in Indiana became a flashpoint for the roiling 
debate over the right of businesses to discriminate against customers 
in the name of personal religion. When asked by a journalist whether 
the shop would serve a same-sex wedding couple, its owners said 
they would refuse such a request.80 The report provoked a backlash 
that forced the restaurant to temporarily close, which prompted the 
creation of a GoFundMe page that raised over $800,000 “[t]o relieve 
78. See, e.g., A.C. MacIntyre, Hume on “Is” and “Ought,” 68 PHIL. REV. 451, 453 (1959)
(“If you wish to pass from a factual statement to a moral statement, treat the moral statement as 
the conclusion to a syllogism and the factual statement as a minor premise. Then to make the 
transition all that is needed is to supply another moral statement as a major premise.”). 
79. Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 641 n.109 (2015) [hereinafter Gay Rights]. 
80. Alyssa Marino, RFRA: Michiana Business Wouldn’t Cater a Gay Wedding, ABC 57
NEWS (Mar. 31, 2015, 7:40 PM PDT), http://www.abc57.com/story/28681598/rfra-first-business 
-to-publicly-deny-same-sex-service.
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the financial loss endured by the proprietors’ stand for faith.”81
During the furor the vendors attempted to make a distinction between 
ordinary gays, whom they would serve, and those who asked them to 
cater a wedding, whom they would refuse.82 
The suggestion seems to be that the objection is not to 
homosexuals themselves, who would be welcome in the business, 
but only to those gays who seek to marry and use the business’s 
services to further that goal. This reasoning appears frequently 
during such debates, and can be read as having the purpose to 
mitigate the harshness of the intended discrimination. Those seeking 
to exclude are not targeting all gay men and lesbians, but only those 
getting married. Carving out this smaller subset of the whole of 
homosexuals puts a natural limit on the reach of the desired 
exemption from nondiscrimination laws. Even those who oppose 
such exemptions might then be persuaded that this small concession 
would not inflict irreparable harm on the body social. It gives the 
merchant the appearance of compromise between extreme positions: 
allow a religious exemption, but limit it only to the narrow instance 
of the gay wedding. 
This strategy, however, must fail for two reasons. First, as a 
practical matter, it is not clear that such businesses are in fact open 
and welcoming to unmarried gays, which undermines their claim that 
they do not intend to discriminate against gays generally but only 
against those getting married. This would be an empirical claim, with 
the burden on the business to show that it indeed treats gay 
customers identically with heterosexuals. Given, however, that the 
basis of the complaint is that they intend not to treat gay customers 
identically, this seems an insurmountable hurdle. Second, courts 
have not been persuaded by arguments that one can accept a group 
while discriminating against a behavior or attribute closely aligned 
with the group itself. Since only gays will take advantage of the new 
right of same-sex marriage, to discriminate against the latter is 
necessarily to discriminate against the former. As far as the law is 
81. Lawrence Billy Jones III, Support Memories Pizza, GOFUNDME, https://www.gofund
me.com/MemoriesPizza (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). 
82. Tom Coyne, After Anti-Gay Controversy, Indiana’s Memories Pizza Reopens to a
Packed House, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/10 
/indiana-memories-pizza-reopens_n_7039644.html. 
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concerned, it makes little sense to claim to welcome gays while 
discriminating against those seeking same-sex marriages. 
1. A Slippery Slope Toward Generalized
Antigay Discrimination 
Those seeking a right to exclude bear the responsibility to detail 
the scope of the religious-based belief that the business holds out as 
requiring protection. What, exactly, do they believe their religions 
demand of them? The fear is that, despite being initially framed as 
limited only to those seeking marriage services, acceding to this 
demand would easily allow an unbounded freedom to refuse to serve 
anyone perceived as gay. In that case the demand is arguably too 
broad, and identical to the eschewed practices that prompted the 
passage of the nondiscrimination laws. The primary purpose of 
nondiscrimination laws is to forbid just such sweeping maltreatment 
based on personal characteristics irrelevant to the commercial 
transaction. 
Some like Slate columnist Mark Joseph Stern “fear . . . that if 
there is any religious accommodation, ‘inevitably, it will soon stretch 
to restaurants, hotels, movie theatres—in short, to all facets of public 
life. A religious right to discriminate against gay people will lead 
directly to anti-gay segregation.’”83 Andrew Koppelman remains 
confident that society will not slide down this slippery slope. “Yet 
hardly any of these cases have occurred . . . . There have been no 
claims of a right to simply refuse to deal with gay people.”84 Despite 
Koppelman’s reassurances, others have indeed taken advantage of 
the debate to refuse service to gays in a wide variety of contexts: 
• A doctor declined to treat an infant with lesbian parents;85
• A Massachusetts law student sued after he failed the bar
exam because he refused to answer a question concerning
the right to same-sex marriage. He argued that requiring him
to “‘affirmatively accept, support, and promote homosexual
83. Gay Rights, supra note 79, at 643 (quoting Mark Joseph Stern).
84. Id. at 643.
85. Abby Phillip, Pediatrician Refuses to Treat Baby with Lesbian Parents and There’s
Nothing Illegal About It, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/morning-mix/wp/2015/02/19/pediatrician-refuses-to-treat-baby-with-lesbian-parents-and-theres 
-nothing-illegal-about-it.
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marriage and homosexual parenting’ . . . violated his First 
Amendment right to exercise his religion.”86 
• “An Indiana business owner went on a local radio station
and said that he had discriminated against gay or lesbian
couples even before Gov. Mike Pence (R) signed a law . . .
protecting business owners who decide to discriminate for
‘religious liberty’ reasons . . . . The business owner . . . said
he had told some LGBT ‘people’ that equipment was broken
in his restaurant and he couldn’t serve them even though it
wasn’t and other people were already eating at the tables.”87
• An East Tennessee hardware store owner posted a “no gays
allowed” sign.88 He later turned this slogan into a line of
caps, t-shirts, and bumper stickers.89
• A Nashville school refused to admit children with gay
parents;90
• When the Arlington, Virginia, Human Rights Commission
ordered Bono Film and Video to duplicate pro-homosexual
videos presented by lesbian activist Lilli Vincenz, the
company “contested the order, claiming a right not to
process material that is obscene, could embarrass
employees, hurt the company’s reputation, or violates the
company’s Christian and ethical values, including material
that promotes homosexuality.”91 Contrary to the
characterization of these films as obscene, in fact they were
86. Sheri Qualters, Failed Applicant Sues Bar Examiners over Test Question on Gay
Marriage, NAT’L L. J. (2007), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=900005484994/Failed 
-applicant-sues-bar-examiners-over-test-question-on-gay-marriage?slreturn=20160229020237.
87. Kay Steiger, One Restaurant Already Celebrated ‘Religious Liberty’ by Turning Away
Gays, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 29, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2015/03/28/3640221/indian
a-business-owner-admits-discriminating-lgbt-people.
88. Travis Gettys, Baptist Pastor Bans Gays from His Tennessee Hardware Store: ‘No I’ll
Never Regret This,’ RAW STORY (July 1, 2015, 10:38 AM), http://www.rawstory.com/2015/07 
/Baptist-pastor-bans-gays-from-his-tennessee-hardware-store-no-ill-never-regret-this; German 
Lopez, A Tennessee Store Put up a “No Gays Allowed” Sign and It’s Totally Legal, VOX (July 1, 
2015, 12:30 PM), http://www.vox.com/2015/7/1/8877903/tennessee-lgbtq-nondiscrimination 
-law.
89. Curtis M. Wong, ‘No Gays Allowed’ Store Owner Now Sells Homophobic Hats, Bumper
Stickers, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2015, 2:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/no 
-gays-allowed-hardware-store_55f06811e4b002d5c07793d9.
90. Joey Garrison, Private School Rejects Children Because Parents Are Gay, USA TODAY
(Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/01/22/private-school-children 
-parents-gay/22197625.
91. George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus Religious Freedom, 95
KY. L.J. 553, 570 (2007). 
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important historical images Vincenz had made of the 
nation’s first gay pride parade in 1970.92 
• Summarizing reports from callers to his radio program,
Michelangelo Signorile tells of “people from all over the
country who had been told to leave restaurants, clothing
stores, or other establishments, or who were told they
couldn’t even come in because they were perceived to be
gay or transgender. One woman described being called a
‘dyke’ when she entered a shop in Ohio, and being told there
was ‘nothing here’ for her. A transgender woman in Florida
said she was asked to leave a beauty salon, told that it was
for ‘women only.’ A gay man said he and his partner were
turned away from a hotel in North Carolina, though he knew
there were vacancies there; the owner said they could get
separate rooms if they liked.”93
Joseph Silk, an Oklahoma state senator who has introduced 
several antigay bills, claims that gays “don’t have a right to be served 
in every single store.”94 And the problem is not limited to private 
businesses: despite assertions that “no state has yet been willing to 
grant public officials or vendors of goods and services related to 
weddings . . . exemptions from state-created obligations to serve 
without discrimination based on sexual orientation,”95 government 
officers have now been granted the right to discriminate against gays 
by North Carolina96 and Texas.97 Even when not officially 
92. Annie Gowen, Gay Activist, Va. Firm Spar over Protest Films, WASH. POST (May 27,
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/26/AR2006052601943 
.html; see also Sarah Miller, Virginia Is for Lovers Business Owners Who Feel the Human Rights 
Commission Poses a Threat to Their Religious Liberties, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 659 
(2008). 
93. MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, IT’S NOT OVER: GETTING BEYOND TOLERANCE,
DEFEATING HOMOPHOBIA, AND WINNING TRUE EQUALITY 28 (2015). 
94. Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, States Weigh Legislation to Let Businesses Refuse to
Serve Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/06/us 
/anticipating-nationwide-right-to-same-sex-marriage-states-weigh-religious-exemption-bills.html 
?_r=0; see H.R. 1597, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015) (“No business entity shall be required to 
provide any services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges related to any 
lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender person, group or association.”). 
95. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 275 (2010). 
96. To avoid having to perform same-sex marriages, the North Carolina legislature passed
Senate Bill 2, which allows magistrates and other state officials to recuse themselves from having 
to perform any marriage ceremonies. S.B. 2, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2015 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 75, http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015/Bills/Senate/PDF/S2v3.pdf. Although designed to 
relieve them of a duty of officiate for gay couples, during the time of their recusal they may 
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authorized, state officers in several states such as Indiana98 and 
Kentucky99 have taken it upon themselves to selectively dispense 
government privileges according to their individual religious 
beliefs.100 
Despite evidence of a rising backlash against gay men and 
lesbians, many businesses claim they have no problem with gay 
individuals, but draw the line at any act that requires them to 
recognize as valid a gay marriage. For example, a Catholic school in 
Georgia hired a band director it knew to be gay and in a long-term 
relationship, but acted to fire him only years later when he intended 
to marry.101 Being gay and sexually active has now become tolerable, 
but legally wedded a step too far. 
perform no ceremonies at all. The bill was vetoed by the Republican governor, but the veto was 
overridden by both the House and the Senate. According to most recent data, 5 percent of North 
Carolina magistrates have filed the recusal form. See Five Percent of North Carolina Magistrates 
File Marriage Recusals, LGBT NATION (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2015 
/09/five-percent-of-north-carolina-magistrates-file-marriage-recusals. 
97. Ken Paxton, Rights of Government Officials Involved with Issuing Same-Sex Marriage
Licenses and Conducting Same-Sex Wedding Ceremonies, ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX. (June 28, 2015), 
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/op/2015/kp0025.pdf. The 
federal district court has called Attorney General Paxton to explain why he should not be held in 
contempt for failing to recognize same-sex marriage. Guillermo Contreras, Judge Orders Paxton 
to Court over Gay-Marriage Order, HOUS. CHRON. (Aug. 5, 2015, 4:41 PM), http://www 
.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Judge-orders-Paxton-to-court-for-failing-to 
-6427132.php.
98. Ind. Clerk Denies Marriage Licenses to Gay Couples Because of ‘Biblical Beliefs,’
LGBTQ NATION (June 27, 2014), http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2014/06/ind-clerk-denies 
-marriage-licenses-to-gay-couples-because-of-biblical-beliefs.
99. Rowan County clerk Kim Davis has become the national face of refusing to comply with
the Obergefell decision, going so far as being jailed for her refusal to obey court orders to issue 
marriage licenses. Proposed Class Action at 4, Miller et al. v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (Aug. 
12, 2015), http://www.aclu-ky.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Rowan-complaint.pdf. 
100. Law professors “Robin Fretwell Wilson and Douglas Laycock have defended the notion
that public employees such as marriage license clerks . . . should be afforded a ‘right . . . to refuse 
to facilitate same-sex marriages, except where such a refusal imposes significant hardship on the 
same-sex couple.’” Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 95, at 286 (citation omitted). 
101. Patrick Saunders, Fired Gay Macon Band Director Files Federal Discrimination
Lawsuit Against School, GA. VOICE (July 1, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://thegavoice.com/fired-gay 
-macon-band-director-files-federal-lawsuit-against-school. This constellation of features—a blind
eye to individual homosexuality followed by punitive dismissal upon marriage—was at the core
of Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ga. 1993) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 70 F.3d
1218 (11th Cir. 1995) reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996), and
on reh’g en banc, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) and aff’d, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
Although Georgia Attorney General had “constructive knowledge of plaintiff’s sexual orientation
through plaintiff’s disclosures to various Department employees” when he offered her a position,
Shahar, 836 F. Supp. at 867, her later firing upon a religious marriage ceremony with her partner
was upheld by the courts. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1100 (11th Cir. 1997).
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But the supposed equal treatment of unwed gays these 
merchants report is a factual claim yet to be supported. On their own 
terms the suits for exemption have merit only if they can first 
demonstrate that they do not discriminate against ordinary gay 
customers, and that their concern is limited to only the narrow 
instance of service to weddings. Such a baseline assertion would be 
valid only if gays frequenting those premises enjoy the same 
freedoms and receive identical treatment as heterosexuals. The 
details of that analysis will vary according to the nature of the 
business. In the pizzeria, for example, this means that gay customers 
on a date can sit close in the booth, hold hands, and indulge in other 
innocuous public displays of affection to the same extent that straight 
couples are permitted. 
Anything less and the declaration that gays are served without 
discrimination reduces to a statement of invisibility: the business will 
serve people who may be gay but who refrain from actually “doing” 
anything identifiably “gay.” We saw a recent example of this 
line-crossing in the public reactions to Michael Sam, a football 
player who, in the emotional exuberance of the NFL draft kissed his 
boyfriend on national television. “Accepting Sam as gay was an act 
of tolerance. Being expected to see him in even a fleeting moment of 
intimacy was beyond tolerance.”102 Closer to the present issue, in 
Elane Photography the defendant likewise pled that they would take 
“photographs and perform . . . other services for same-sex customers, 
so long as they did not request photographs that involved or endorsed 
same-sex weddings.”103 Upon closer examination, however, the 
business conceded that in reality it “would also have refused to take 
photos of same-sex couples in other contexts, including photos of a 
couple holding hands or showing affection for each other.”104 
The divergence between surface tolerance for gays and negative 
reactions to overt behaviors is not unusual. Research “[r]esults show 
that heterosexuals are as willing to extend formal rights to same-sex 
couples as they are to unmarried heterosexual couples. However, 
102. SIGNORILE, supra note 93, at 84.
103. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 61 (N.M. 2013).
104. Id.
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they are less willing to grant informal privileges” such as public 
displays of affection.105 
The intended limitation on the exemption encounters another 
difficulty in the inherent contradiction between the self-portrait of 
equal treatment and the need for an exemption to practice unequal 
treatment. In Elane Photography, perhaps the first court analysis of 
the question of a religious exemption to a nondiscrimination law in 
this context, the court considered a complaint from a lesbian couple 
after the defendant refused to photograph a commitment 
ceremony.106 In response to a similar argument that she does not 
discriminate against gays but only against gay weddings, the court 
expressed the view that “if a restaurant offers a full menu to male 
customers, it may not refuse to serve entrees to women, even if it 
will serve them appetizers . . . . Elane Photography’s willingness to 
offer some services to [the plaintiffs] does not cure its refusal to 
provide other services that it offered to the general public.”107 In 
essence, such defendants argue that they will treat gays decently so 
long as they do not overstep their assigned place. That stipulation 
alone defeats the premise of their claim to otherwise treat gays 
equally, save for weddings, since only gays are burdened with the 
need to monitor their actions in order to prevent offense. 
We thus have ample reason to be skeptical about self-professed 
equal treatment of homosexuals by businesses seeking a 
religious-based right to discriminate against marrying gays. They 
either do not tolerate from gays the same range of behaviors 
uncontroversial in straight customers, or gays censor themselves so 
as not to create an uncomfortable situation.108 Moreover, because 
they are offering services to heterosexuals that they withhold from 
gays and lesbians, then on that basis alone they do not treat both 
groups equally. 
Whatever the case, the fact remains that the argument itself 
misses the larger point from the perspective of their gay and lesbian 
customers: 
105. Long Doan et al., Formal Rights and Informal Privileges for Same-Sex Couples:
Evidence from a National Survey Experiment, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 1172, 1172 (2014). 
106. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 59–60.
107. Id. at 62.
108. Cf. YOSHINO, supra note 38, at ix (“To cover is to tone down a disfavored identity to fit
into the mainstream.”). 
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Some of the religious objectors are wont to say that they are 
more than willing to have LGBT employees and customers; 
the objectors just draw their religious line at marriage. 
However authentically this posture captures their religious 
sentiment, it is spectacularly tone-deaf and insulting. The 
act of marrying represents a high point in the lives of many 
couples, particularly those same-sex couples who have lived 
for many years deprived by law and custom of such 
opportunities. Their actual and perceived status as being 
married, with the identical social, moral, and legal force as 
different sex couples, is of profound significance to their 
sense of equal citizenship. For a vendor, employer, or 
public official to discriminate them with respect to their 
wedding or marital status is a deep insult on their full and 
equal place in American society.109 
Because these businesses spare their heterosexual customers this 
insult, any assurance that gays will be treated equally is a delusion. 
2. Relating Status and Conduct
On its face the demanded religious exemption to discriminate in 
commercial settings promises to set off a flood of prejudice against 
gays and lesbians. Even those sympathetic to the requests may view 
this as a step too far, and thus the promise is given that the 
exemption is needed only for those entering same-sex marriages and 
does not offer a broader justification to discriminate against all gays 
and lesbians. This argument, however, has failed to convince those 
courts that have considered it. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, a Lakewood, Colorado, bakery, refused 
the gay plaintiffs’ order for a cake for their wedding.110 The plaintiffs 
sued under the Colorado Antidiscrimination Act (CADA).111 The 
bakery argued that “it did not decline to make Craig’s and Mullins’ 
wedding cake ‘because of’ their sexual orientation”112 as the law 
109. Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and the Future of LGBT Rights,
7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 79 (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602233 
[hereinafter Moving Targets]. 
110. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. 14CA1351, 2015 COA 115, at *1 (Colo. App.
Aug. 13, 2015). 
111. Id. at *3.
112. Id. at *14.
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required.113 Relying on the distinction considered in the previous 
section, the defendant stated that “it does not object to or refuse to 
serve patrons because of their sexual orientation, and that it assured 
Craig and Mullins that it would design and create any other bakery 
product for them, just not a wedding cake.”114 
The success of this argument depended on maintaining a 
principled distinction between status, which is protected by CADA, 
and conduct, which is not. In its view, Masterpiece does not 
discriminate because of the plaintiffs’ sexual orientation—it will sell 
them other baked goods—but only because of the conduct of having 
a same-sex wedding. In some contexts this distinction might be 
persuasive. If the shop had a policy to discriminate against anyone 
who requested a red velvet wedding cake, and only same-sex couples 
placed such orders, then even though all gay couples would be 
refused service it could not be said to be “because of” their sexual 
orientation. 
The question for the court, then, is whether the relationship 
between the status of sexual orientation and the conduct of planning 
a same-sex wedding is sufficiently accidental to support 
Masterpiece’s defense, or whether the protected status bears a close 
and even exclusive relationship to the targeted conduct such that one 
cannot reasonably discriminate on the latter without necessarily 
discriminating on the former. 
In reaching its decision, the court pointed to prior U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions that had considered this question in similar contexts. 
In 2010’s Christian Legal Social Chapter of the University of 
California, Hastings College of Law v. Martinez,115 the Court notes 
that “CLS contends that it does not exclude individuals because of 
sexual orientation, but rather ‘on the basis of a conjunction of 
conduct and the belief that the conduct is not wrong.’ Our decisions 
have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this 
context.”116 In support of this conclusion, Justice Ginsburg cited both 
to the majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,117 which found, “When 
homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that 
113. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(A) (2014).
114. Masterpiece, 2015 COA 115, at *14.
115. 561 U.S. 661, 689 (2010).
116. Id.
117. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual 
persons to discrimination,”118 as well as to Justice O’Connor’s even 
more on-point concurrence: “While it is true that the law applies only 
to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely 
correlated with being homosexual. Under such circumstances, [the] 
law is targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay 
persons as a class.”119 
Finally, Masterpiece notes that the Obergefell Court explicitly 
rejects the bakery’s assertion that discrimination against same-sex 
marriage is distinguishable from discrimination on sexual 
orientation. Because the two are so inextricably bound, Obergefell 
“equated laws precluding same-sex marriage to discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation.”120 
In these decisions, the Supreme Court recognized that, in 
some cases, conduct cannot be divorced from status. This is 
so when the conduct is so closely correlated with the status 
that it is engaged in exclusively or predominantly by 
persons who have that particular status. We conclude that 
the act of same-sex marriage constitutes such conduct 
because it is “engaged in exclusively or predominantly” by 
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. Masterpiece’s distinction, 
therefore, is one without a difference. But for their sexual 
orientation, Craig and Mullins would not have sought to 
enter into a same-sex marriage, and but for their intent to do 
so, Masterpiece would not have denied them its services.121 
The Masterpiece decision is not unique in holding that 
“discrimination on the basis of one’s opposition to same-sex 
marriage is discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”122 A 
118. Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
120. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. 14CA1351 2015 COA 115, at *6 (Colo. App.
Aug. 13, 2015) (observing that the “denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry” is a 
“disability on gays and lesbians” which “serves to disrespect and subordinate them”). 
121. Id. at *6.
122. Id. at *7. See also Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty
Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 213 (2010) [hereinafter 
Same-Sex-Marriage]. It reads: 
One argument was that pursuit of a same-sex relationship is conduct, not an orientation 
or other personal characteristic; opposite-sex marriage laws are open to persons of both 
heterosexual and homosexual orientations. The courts rejected this claim, holding that 
same-sex intimate conduct correlates so greatly with same-sex orientation that the 
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similar result was reached in In re Klein.123 On facts identical to 
those found in Masterpiece, Sweet Cakes by Melissa, a Portland, 
Oregon, baker, refused a wedding cake order from two lesbians.124 
Here, too, the defendant sought to distinguish her discriminatory 
actions from the plaintiffs’ sexual orientation.125 Citing the same 
Supreme Court opinions reviewed in Masterpiece, Klein concluded 
that “[t]here is simply no reason to distinguish between services for a 
wedding ceremony between two persons of the same sex and the 
sexual orientation of that couple. The conduct, a marriage ceremony, 
is inextricably linked to a person’s sexual orientation.”126 
While claiming to be against same-sex marriage but not against 
gays may seem a kinder, more moderate position than wholesale 
prejudice, thus far this position has been viewed as a distinction 
without a difference. “[N]obody should be mistaken about the 
underlying reason for their opposition to same-sex marriage: they 
‘disapprove of homosexuality.’ As Justice Scalia observed in his 
Lawrence dissent, ‘preserving the traditional institution of marriage’ 
is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of 
same-sex couples.”127 
C. Summary
The debates concerning the wisdom of granting a religious 
exemption to nondiscrimination laws in the marketplace involve an 
eclectic assortment of rhetorical feints over and above the strictly 
legal arguments in defense of that claimed exemption. Examples 
include suggestions that merchants have a default right to exclude 
anyone they wish, and that the exemption desired is a de minimis 
concession because it would be invoked against a small subset of the 
broader gay community.128 
discrimination runs against the orientation. The courts’ rationale rested on the 
centrality of the conduct to the homosexual person’s identity. 
Id. 
123. Nos. 44-14 & 45-14, 2015 WL 4503460, at *1 (Or. Div. of Fin. & Corp. Sec. July 2,
2015). 
124. Id. at *11.
125. Id. at *51.
126. Id.
127. James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the Unequal
Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 99, 123 (2015) (citation omitted).
128. See supra Part I.A.
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Both of these prove problematic in their effective use to support 
the claim for exemption. The right to exclude is a new and tainted 
legal norm, and thus its invocation does not serve as the trump card 
intended. Because exclusion from commercial property reflects 
neither our founding tradition, nor the inevitable entailments of 
property ownership,129 the speaker must still defend the assertion that 
this new effort to discriminate against gays should fall within the 
racist rule. Aware of its historical roots, many may decline to invoke 
the rule so as to avoid a need to explain why they hope to justify 
their antigay actions by analogizing them to Jim Crow bigotry. 
The attempt to defend discrimination based on conduct rather 
than status similarly fails to deflect concern that the exemption, if 
granted, would provide a basis for unrelenting discrimination against 
gay men and lesbians generally. Granting the tight relationship 
between the targeted conduct and the protected status, no reasonable 
person can assert that to discriminate against same-sex marriage is 
not necessarily discrimination against gays. 
Given this discussion, the remainder of this essay shall assume 
that no general right to exclude exists in the commercial context, 
such that it would remove from the claimant the burden to articulate 
why this particular discrimination is warranted. It also accepts that 
those who seek the exemption are in principle seeking a protected 
freedom to discriminate against all gays and lesbians. The legitimacy 
of the exemption therefore depends on the direct legal arguments and 
not on indirect strategic maneuvers. 
III. IS BAKING A CAKE FORCED SPEECH?
Although framing their cases in terms of religious exercise, 
defendants inevitably invoke free speech rights as well. The 
reasoning typically tracks some form of the following: The services 
at issue involve an expression of approval for or endorsement of the 
nuptials; being forced to provide cakes (or dresses, or flowers, etc.) 
compels speech in violation of the constitutional protections of the 
First Amendment. Although no court has accepted this argument, 
thus far it has not been offered in its strongest form, which ties the 
perception of messages to the background social norms. 
129. See supra Part I.A.
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A. The Legal Species of Coerced Speech
Masterpiece offered such a compelled speech argument, one that 
was summarily rejected by the court.130 In its analysis, the opinion 
noted that the compelled speech doctrine had originated in West 
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,131 which had ruled that 
Jehovah’s Witnesses could not be forced to offer the pledge of 
allegiance in school.132 Thereafter, the jurisprudence has split along 
two different lines. The first follows Barnette in “prohibit[ing] the 
government from requiring that an individual ‘speak the 
government’s message.’”133 This prong of the coerced speech 
doctrine was more recently addressed by the Supreme Court in 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,134 in 
which law schools argued that a federal law mandating the presence 
of military recruiters violated school policies prohibiting 
discrimination against homosexuals and compelled them to speak the 
government’s message of gay prejudice as if it were their own.135 
The second line of cases holds that government cannot “require an 
individual ‘to host or accommodate another speaker’s message.’”136 
This conclusion follows Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,137 
a case that found unconstitutional a Florida statute that gave a “right 
to reply” to any political candidate who had received negative 
editorial treatment by the newspaper,138 and was the basis for recent 
decisions in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Group of Boston139 and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.140 
While exemption-seekers have argued that enforcing a 
nondiscrimination rule violates both lines of the compelled speech 
doctrine, the threshold inquiry according to the Masterpiece analysis 
is whether the baker has any First Amendment rights at issue. Since 
130. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. 14CA1351, 2015 COA 115, at *25–26 (Colo.
App. Aug. 13, 2015). 
131. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
132. Id. at 642.
133. Masterpiece, 2015 COA 115, at *26 (Colo. App. Aug. 13, 2015) (quoting Rumsfeld
v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63 (2006)).
134. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
135. Masterpiece, 2015 COA 115, at *51.
136. Id. (quoting Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 63).
137. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
138. Id. at 256.
139. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
140. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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no actual speech is involved in supplying a wedding cake, the 
defendant bears the burden of showing that their activities are such 
as would trigger First Amendment protections. Because almost any 
act can contain an expressive element that would stymy efforts at 
governmental regulation, the Supreme Court has sought to limit this 
shelter “only to conduct that is ‘inherently expressive.’”141 If cake 
baking does not rise to the level of being “inherently expressive,” 
then the requirement that bakery shops provide equal service will not 
infringe any speech rights they may have. 
According to the Masterpiece court, the questions are “whether 
‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and 
[whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.’”142 Masterpiece argued that 
wedding cakes inherently communicate “a celebratory message 
about marriage, and that, by forcing it to make cakes for same-sex 
weddings, the Commission’s cease and desist order 
unconstitutionally compels it to express a celebratory message about 
same-sex marriage it does not support.”143 
The court did not need to reach this question because although it 
acknowledged that “creating a wedding cake involves skill and 
artistry,” Masterpiece had refused the order before learning any 
details of the intended cake’s design.144 It was therefore not possible 
to “determine whether [the] desired wedding cake would constitute 
symbolic speech subject to First Amendment protections” since the 
record does not reflect the intentions of the plaintiffs as to design.145 
For example, a cake with only icing flowers would communicate no 
particular message, but requiring the shop to write, “Gay Marriage is 
Wonderful” would prove more problematic.146 
The need for fuller details before finding a speech violation can 
be illustrated by the suit against Hands On Originals (HOO), a 
141. Masterpiece, 2015 COA 115, ¶ 52 (quoting Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66).
142. Id. at *28–29 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)).
143. Id. at *31.
144. Id. at *31–32.
145. Id.
146. For example, no suit arose after a grocery refused to provide a cake with the writing,
“Happy Birthday, Adolf Hitler.” Larry McShane, Happy Birthday, Adolf Hitler! Boy with Nazi 
Leader’s Name Denied ShopRite Cake, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www 
.nydailynews.com/news/world/happy-birthday-adolf-hitler-boy-nazi-leader-denied-shoprite-cake 
-article-1.358050.
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Lexington, Kentucky, t-shirt shop.147 Asked to produce the official 
shirt for the annual gay pride festival, the shop refused due to its 
religious objections to the message.148 While the store lost in early 
hearings, it succeeded in final arguments before the Fayette Circuit 
Court.149 According to the court, the shop was entitled to reject the 
order without violating the city’s fairness ordinance because it was 
rejecting the message, not the customer.150 “[P]roducing the t-shirts 
as requested would require HOO to print a t-shirt with the words 
‘Lexington Pride Festival’ communicating the message that people 
should take pride in sexual relationships or sexual activity outside a 
marriage between a man and a woman.”151 At oral argument HOO 
showed that it had “declined to print at least thirteen (13) orders for 
message based reasons. Those print orders that were refused by HOO 
included shirts promoting a strip club, pens promoting a sexually 
explicit video, and shirts containing a violence related message.”152 
Consequently, HOO was found not to have declined the order 
“because of” sexual orientation, but because the message conflicted 
with its religious beliefs.153 
Because the planned cake was never discussed, the Masterpiece 
court did not need to fully delve into the legal details of the free 
speech dimensions of the complaint. One case that does offer that 
analysis is Elane Photography v. Willock.154 The facts describe a 
pattern that has become predictable. Plaintiff Willock contacted 
Elane Photography seeking its services for a commitment ceremony 
with her female partner. After being told that the shop “photographed 
147. See Hands On Originals, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Human Rights Comm’n
et al., No. 14-CI-04474, at 15–16 (Ky. Cir. Apr. 27, 2015), https://perma.cc/75FY-Z77D. 
148. Scott Sloan, Commission Sides with Gay Group Against Hands On Originals,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.kentucky.com/2012/11/26/2421990 
/city-rules-hands-on-originals.html. 
149. Hands On Originals, No. 14-CI-04474, at 15–16.
150. Id. at 10.
151. Id. at 5–6.
152. Id. at 9.
153. Id. at 8−9. A structurally similar case, with the roles reversed, arose when a woman went
into an Office Depot to order copies printed of a pro-life flyer. The business refused on the 
ground that company policy prohibits “the copying of any type of material that advocates any 
form of racial or religious discrimination or the persecution of certain groups of people.” Scott 
Shackford, Does Office Depot Have the Right to Refuse to Print Anti-Abortion Fliers?, 
REASON.COM (Sept. 11, 2015, 3:15 PM), https://reason.com/blog/2015/09/11/does-office-depot 
-have-the-right-to-refu. She is suing, although when offered to use the self-service printers she
declined because that would be an “inconvenience.” Id.
154. 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
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only ‘traditional weddings,’”155 Willock filed a discrimination suit 
under the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA). 
As part of its defense, Elane Photography argued that 
“by requiring it to photograph same-sex weddings on the same 
basis that it photographs opposite-sex weddings, the NMHRA 
unconstitutionally compels it to ‘create and engage in expression’ 
that sends a positive message about same-sex marriage not shared by 
its owner.”156 The court, however, rejected this argument, providing 
analysis on both lines of the compelled speech doctrine. 
On the first, or government message prong, unlike Barnette, the 
NMHRA does not require that the photographer “recite or display 
any message. It does not even require Elane Photography to take 
photographs. The NMHRA only mandates that if [she] operates a 
business as a public accommodation, [she] cannot discriminate 
against potential clients based on their sexual orientation.”157 As for 
the second prong protecting a party from being forced to 
accommodate the message of a third party, Elane Photography made 
two arguments: First, as an expressive, even artistic service, Elane 
Photography should receive the same deference to its message that 
the Supreme Court extended to parades in Hurley.158 Second, the 
photographer argued that if she were required to photograph 
same-sex unions, observers would attribute to her messages of 
approval and support for these relationships.159 
In Hurley the Supreme Court had considered whether the 
organizers of Boston’s annual St. Patrick’s Day parade should be 
forced to allow a gay Irish group to march.160 The Court sided with 
the organizers, reasoning that while individual gay persons were not 
excluded from marching, the inclusion of the gay group would alter 
the message the parade was intended to communicate.161 Elane 
Photography analogized its position to that of the parade with a 
particularized expression that gay couples hoped to co-opt to 
broadcast their own message.162 
155. Id. at 60.
156. Id. at 63.
157. Id. at 64.
158. Id. at 65.
159. Id.
160. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995).
161. Id. at 577.
162. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 68.
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The argument is not wholly unreasonable. Hurley, especially 
when combined with Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,163 had 
significantly expanded “new expressive association right[s] . . . [such 
that] [a]lmost any association is eligible for the protection from 
antidiscrimination laws that the Court provides” in these opinions.164 
While announced in the context of nonprofit organizations, 
extending the impact of these decisions to businesses is easily 
done.165 If “commercial business enterprises can have substantial 
expressive dimensions,”166 then Elane Photography’s defense enjoys 
a certain surface coherence.167 But because the NMHRA extends 
only to the “photographs that Elane Photography produces for hire in 
the ordinary course of its business as a public accommodation, [the 
scope of the law] has no relation to the artistic merit of photographs 
produced by Elane Photography.”168 “While photography may be 
expressive, the operation of a photography business is not.”169 
The court then takes up the second argument that if the business 
does the photo shoot, “observers will believe that it and its owners 
approve of same-sex marriage.”170 Perceived message did play a 
factor in the Hurley outcome: “in the context of an expressive 
parade . . . the parade’s overall message is distilled from the 
individual presentations along the way, and each unit’s expression is 
perceived by spectators as part of the whole.”171 Given the practical 
realities of hiring wedding photographers, the court is skeptical that 
such for-hire vendors are assumed to offer any particular approval of 
the event along with their delivery of services. In any case the 
business is “free to disavow, implicitly or explicitly, any messages 
163. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
164. KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 40, at 27.
165. Cf. Richard Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy
Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 139 (2000) (“Only the bold and foolhardy would claim that 
current law allows business associations, large or small, public or private, out from under the 
thumb of the antidiscrimination laws.”). 
166. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and School, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1917, 1927
n.49 (2001).
167. For a contrary view, however, see Dent, supra note 91, at 573 (“[I]t also seems unlikely
that a for-profit business corporation would qualify as an expressive association under Hurley and 
Dale.”). 
168. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 66 (N.M. 2013).
169. Id. at 68.
170. Id.
171. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 577 (1995).
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that it believes the photographs convey.”172 Masterpiece reaches a 
similar result, concluding that providing a wedding cake on a 
nondiscriminatory basis does not convey a “celebratory message 
about same-sex weddings,” and that were any such message inferred 
it would be “more likely to be attributed to the customer than to 
Masterpiece.”173 
B. Social Norms and Perceived Messages
Like Masterpiece, Elane Photography decides the issue by 
pointing out that given the context, a “reasonable observer” is likely 
to attribute any perceived message of a wedding cake to the couple 
and not to the baker.174 Stated generally, context determines whether 
a purported message of endorsement is reasonable under those 
circumstances. For example,  
[w]hen the newspaper prints an advertisement for a fee,
readers generally do not consider it an endorsement of the
advertisement by the paper. No one buys an Oldsmobile
because she saw an advertisement for it in her trusted
newspaper, the Oakland Tribune, and believed that the
Tribune endorsed or vouched for the automobile.175
The broad gesture toward context, however, is not sufficiently
granular to instruct us what to look for when evaluating such claims. 
Neither court offered a detailed roadmap showing how it arrived at 
this sociological and linguistic insight. Because similar defenses are 
likely to continue to be offered, a more textured consideration of the 
background variables that impact the perception of implied messages 
is well worth our effort. 
172. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 70.
173. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. 14CA1351, 2015 COA 115, at *33−34 (Colo.
App. Aug. 13, 2015); see also Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown 
Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 27 (D.C. 1987) (“One nondiscriminatory reason asserted by Georgetown for 
its denial of the tangible benefits contained in ‘University Recognition’ was that it could not give 
its accompanying ‘endorsement’ to the student groups without violating its religious principles. 
But as the Human Rights Act, properly construed, requires no direct, intangible ‘endorsement,’ 
Georgetown cannot avoid a finding of discrimination on that ground.”). If, according to the court 
in Gay Rights Coalition, the provision of tangible benefits such as funding and meeting space did 
not constitute an “endorsement” of homosexuality contrary to the Catholic university’s religious 
beliefs, then the selling of a wedding cake should not rise to the level of “endorsing” any specific 
marriage. 
174. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 69.
175. Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Defamation, 66 TEX. L. REV. 303, 338 (1987).
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Koppelman offers the key insight in this regard when he 
suggests that “[f]ollowing the unspoken norm endorses nothing; only 
departing from the norm sends a message.”176 With this observation, 
he ties into the research on scripts and similar ways of processing 
social information. Culture—whether institutional, social, or 
organizational—provides “a basis for the organization of activities, 
responses, perceptions, and experiences by the conscious self.”177 
These internalized norms offer a default set of responses for 
frequently-encountered situations.178 Because much of what we do 
and say draws upon this stock of prefabricated responses, the 
performance signals little more than the lack of motivation to blaze 
an individualized message.179 If every man wears a tie and jacket to 
the office, then wearing that clothing signals only that one is a 
member of the community and follows the expected forms. Wearing 
shorts and a tropical shirt to an important business meeting, however, 
sends a specific and deliberate message. It is deviation from 
expectation that sends a message, not conforming to conventional 
practice. 
The Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor180 
acknowledged this tendency for signals to arise from deviations from 
expected routines. The opinion “taught that an ‘unusual deviation 
from the usual tradition’ that ‘operate[s] to deprive same-sex 
couples’ of customary benefits available to others is ‘strong evidence 
of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that 
class.’”181 Accordingly, service for same-sex weddings would send a 
message of the kind that triggers free speech concerns only if the 
background social norms pervasively reject that acceptance. 
This perspective generates two related conclusions. First, 
whether or not an action (such as providing a wedding cake) sends a 
message from the baker will be a fact-specific inquiry taking into 
consideration the background social norms in the relevant 
176. KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 40, at 37. See also RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE
EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 257 (2015) (“[A]n old tradition 
communicates less about current attitudes than a new governmental endorsement.”). 
177. Michelle Z. Rosaldo, Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling, in CULTURE
THEORY: ESSAYS ON MIND, SELF, AND EMOTION 137, 140 (Richard A. Shweder & Robert A. 
LeVine eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1984). 
178. Id. at 140−41.
179. Id. at 141.
180. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
181. Oleske, supra note 127, at 104 (citing Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693) (citation omitted).
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community. Even from the broader perspective of national trends, 
this assessment will vary over time as social attitudes change. 
These conclusions offer a more receptive opening for a 
defendant’s complaints of forced speech than the courts have thus far 
been willing to recognize. Although the legal outcome may still be 
the same, it is important that the concerns from both sides be heard in 
their most generous lights. 
For purposes of the present discussion, we must concede that 
even twenty or thirty years ago the social prohibition on 
homosexuality was sufficiently pervasive as to support a plea that 
serving openly gay couples would constitute departure from the 
social baseline and thereby send a message of support and 
endorsement. The first challenge for the court will be to identify the 
relevant community of “right-minded” individuals that constitute the 
normative standard against which the discriminatory service provider 
is to be evaluated.182 This may be limited to the likely customers of 
the business, or broadened to consider the opinions of the general 
community. 
The second question then asks whether the cultural climate 
within that relevant community has sufficiently changed as to 
remove the implied message of support when providing services. 
Defendants like Masterpiece and Elane Photography offer the 
argument that the background conventions have not changed to this 
degree, and that an act that would unquestionably have been 
interpreted as a demonstration of approval ten years ago does so still 
today. If true, this fact may be insufficient for an ultimate victory, 
but if they can establish that their speech rights have been infringed, 
the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a compelling 
interest in the requirement. In no case thus far have defendants 
successfully overcome the first hurdle to reach this later phase. 
A brief description of two examples of changing legal attitudes 
toward homosexuality will illustrate the changes these background 
norms can undergo, and show how the judgment of what constitutes 
a message-sending “departure” cannot be a uniform or stable 
determination. What sends a message at one point, in one 
182. The formal criteria to identify the relevant community will itself be a problematic issue,
and one not dealt with here. For example, how should we determine whether it is the baker’s 
community (e.g., church) that matters, or the people attending the wedding? Even within small 
towns, these two segments can vary significantly on touchstone norms. 
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community, may be simple compliance with social convention at 
another time or in a different locale. 
1. Defamation Per Se
The tort of defamation seeks to protect personal reputation from 
false imputations that would cause “a ‘substantial and respectable 
minority’ of the population [to] think less of [the] plaintiff.”183 While 
most instances of alleged defamation require that the plaintiff 
prove damages, some statements have been deemed so 
inherently damaging that injuries are presumed. The law has 
traditionally recognized four broad categories of such per se 
defamation: “(1) statements accusing plaintiff of a criminal offense, 
(2) statements that plaintiff has a loathsome disease, (3) statements
incompatible with plaintiff’s business, trade, profession or office,
and (4) statements accusing plaintiff of serious sexual
misconduct.”184
For some, even the words referring to homosexuality are so 
fraught with explosive danger that they must be avoided.185 
Unsurprisingly, then, the question whether imputations of 
homosexuality qualify as defamation receives sporadic popular 
attention when male celebrities are quick to initiate lawsuits 
whenever their heterosexual credentials have been impugned. Few 
stars have exerted more effort than Tom Cruise186 to sue anyone who 
183. DAVID ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 1:7 (2003).
184. Randy M. Fogle, Is Calling Someone “Gay” Defamatory?: The Meaning of Reputation,
Community Mores, Gay Rights, and Free Speech, 3 LAW & SEX. 165, 168 (1993). 
185. For example, during the Bush administration the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration first asserted that sponsored events should not include the words “Gay,” 
“Lesbian,” “Bisexual,” or “Transgender” in program titles, although the administration later 
permitted the use of those terms in the agency’s sponsored events. HHS Backs Down on Gay 
Funding Threats, 365GAY.COM (Feb. 18, 2005), http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2005/02/19 
/17225631.php. After vanity car tags saying “GAYSROK” and “GAYRYTS” were rejected by 
the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles, the State Tax Commission was asked to rule “whether a 
reasonable person would believe the terms ‘gays are OK’ and ‘gay rights’ are, themselves, 
offensive to good taste and decency.” Utah Woman Can Keep “GAYSROK” License Plate, NBC 
NEWS (July 28, 2005), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/8734642/ns/us_news-weird_news/t/Utah 
-woman-can-keep-gaysrok-license-plate/#.VfXuKZdSSSo. While earlier New York had sought to
prevent the use of “Gay” in a nonprofit corporation, Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 293
N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1973), it later attempted a similar ban on use of the word “queer.” John Caher,
First Amendment Raised in Battle for “Queer” Group Title, 230 N.Y. L. J. 1, 7 (2003).
186. See Steven M. Silverman, Cruise Wins $10 Million in Gay Lawsuit, PEOPLE (Jan. 16,
2003), http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,625389,00.html; see also Cindy Wang, A 
Chronological History of Tom Cruise Lawsuits, DOT429 (July 24, 2014), http://dot429.com 
/articles/4722-a-chronological-history-of-tom-cruise-lawsuits. 
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suggests he might be gay. Former Madonna lover James Albright 
sued after a picture in a book confused another man, an “outspoken 
homosexual,” with Albright.187 Sean “Puffy” Combs188 and singer 
Robbie Williams189 likewise have histories of threatening libel suits 
against anyone suggesting they may be homosexual. Although an 
element of a defamation claim is that the statement must be false, 
individuals have threatened defamation suits despite being later 
revealed to be gay.190 
Some courts have determined that accusations of homosexuality 
do fall into the category of per se defamation. Examples include 
Head v. Newton,191 which held that “the statement that someone was 
a ‘queer’ is slanderous per se because it imputes the crime of 
sodomy,”192 and Schomer v. Smidt’s193 ruling that “a false imputation 
of the commission of a homosexual act is slanderous per se.”194 To 
the extent that calling someone “gay” constitutes per se defamation 
187. Amrak Prods., Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69, 71 (1st Cir. 2005). Other instances of suits
arising from photographs rather than words include model Ben Massing suing after his photo was 
used in a gay magazine, leading to “the false and defamatory impression that Plaintiff is sexually 
lustful and promiscuous, poses nude and subscribes to homosexuality.” Verified Complaint at § 
111, Messing v. Avalon Equity Partners, LLC et al., Index No. 113039-2008 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 
2008); see also Palmisano v. Modernismo Publ’ns, Ltd., 470 N.Y.S.2d 196 (App. Div. 1983) 
(“Plaintiff also alleged libel in that the advertisement contained false and imaginary first person 
statements which conveyed thoughts and feelings which were not his, and knowingly conveyed 
the impression that plaintiff is a homosexual, which he alleged he is not.”). 
188. Andy Towle, Lawyers for P. Diddy: For the Record, He’s Not Gay, TOWLEROAD (Apr.
26, 2010, 2:56 PM), http://www.towleroad.com/2010/04/lawyers-for-p-diddy-for-the-record-hes 
-not-gay. (copy of complaint on file with author).
189. Ciar Byrne, William Wins Big Libel Damages over Reports He Is Gay, THE INDEP. (Dec.
7, 2005), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/williams-wins-big-libel-damages-over 
-reports-he-is-gay-518476.html.
190. Perhaps the most notorious was Liberace’s successful suit in 1959. Roy Greenslade, The
Meaning of ‘Fruit:’ How the Daily Mirror Libelled Liberace, THE GUARDIAN (May 26, 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2009/may/26/daily-mirror-medialaw. More 
recently, Olympian Ian Thorpe threatened to sue artists who implied his homosexuality in a 
collage. Allan Maki, Thorpe No Fan of This Artwork; Swimmer Angry over Gay Label, But 
Artists Say It’s All in Fun, GLOBE AND MAIL (TORONTO) (July 20, 2004), at S3. Thorpe later 
admitted that he is in fact gay. Amanda Meade, Ian Thorpe: I’m Finally Comfortable Saying I’m 
a Gay Man, THE GUARDIAN, (July 13, 2014, 7:56 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/sport 
/2014/jul/13/ian-thorpe-comfortable-saying-im-a-gay-man-parkinson. 
191. 596 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. 1980).
192. Id.
193. 170 Cal. Rptr. 662 (Ct. App. 1981).
194. Id. at 666. See Dally v. Orange Cnty. Publ’ns, 497 N.Y.S.2d 947 (App. Div. 1986);
Murphy v. Pizarrio, No. 94 CIV. 0471 (JFK), 1995 WL 565990 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1995); 
Thomas v. BET Sound-Stage Rest./Brettco, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 448 (D. Md. 1999). 
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because it “imputes the crime of sodomy,”195 as laws and attitudes 
change, we would expect courts to gradually reflect the more 
liberalizing trends.196 
Accordingly, the court in Moricoli v. Schwartz197 declined to 
rule that accusations of homosexuality are per se injuries due to “the 
changing temper of the times.”198 Similarly reflective of the changing 
views on whether homosexuality constituted per se defamation are 
the changes between editions of Prosser’s classic text on torts. In the 
1971 fourth edition he states that “it appears very likely, in view of 
popular feeling on the matter, that the imputation of homosexuality 
to either sex would be held to constitute a fifth category, actionable 
without proof of damage.”199 But by the fifth edition, in 1984, the 
text correctly summarizes the existing case law saying that “there 
have been some indications that imputation of deviate sexual 
behavior would be actionable on the part of either a man or a 
woman”200 while lacking the prognosis that homosexuality was well 
on its way toward becoming an established fifth category of per se 
defamation. 
The differing currents of legal and cultural opinions have 
resulted in a conflicted state of the law on this question: 
Courts generally hold that (1) false statements of 
homosexuality are defamatory per se, and damages are 
presumed, either because they either imply criminal 
conduct, unchastity, or expose a plaintiff to public hatred, 
contempt or ridicule; (2) false imputations of homosexuality 
are not defamatory per se, requiring a plaintiff to allege and 
prove actual damages; or (3) such statements are not 
defamatory at all because of the Supreme Court’s decision 
195. Prior to Lawrence, “[c]ourts typically avoid the issue of whether an imputation of
homosexuality is defamatory in terms of a person’s reputation. Some courts held that an 
imputation of homosexuality is defamatory per se because it infers the commission of sodomy.” 
Fogle, supra note 184, at 180. 
196. See Patrice S. Arend, Defamation in an Age of Political Correctness: Should a False
Public Statement That a Person Is Gay Be Defamatory?, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 99, 101 (1997) 
(“The actionability of the alleged defamatory words has depended in large part on the temper of 
the times and the contemporary opinion, so that what may be actionable in one age may not be in 
another.”). 
197. 361 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App. 1977).
198. Id. at 76.
199. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 760 (4th ed. 1971).
200. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 793
(5th ed. 1984). 
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in Lawrence v. Texas, as well as society’s increasing 
acceptance of homosexuality.201 
The tides of change influence the kind of harm encompassed by 
the defamation tort. A “statement is defamatory only if it prejudices a 
person in the eyes of a substantial number of ‘right-minded’ 
people.”202 Once antigay prejudice becomes recognized as wrong, 
courts will be unlikely to find accusations of homosexuality 
defamatory because the “plaintiff in this case could only be injured 
in the eyes of homophobic individuals. Therefore, allowing a person 
to recover in such a defamation action would contradict public 
policies to treat people equally regardless of sexual orientation and to 
combat homophobia in our society.”203 Consequently, as Moricoli 
implied, the “social climate within a community at the time the 
statement is made must be considered in determining whether or not 
a particular statement is defamatory.”204 These trends culminated in 
the New York Court of Appeals overturning its prior rule and now 
holding that: 
In light of the tremendous evolution in social attitudes 
regarding homosexuality, the elimination of the legal 
sanctions that troubled the Second Department in 1984 and 
the considerable legal protection and respect that the law of 
this state now accords lesbians, gays and bisexuals, it 
cannot be said that current public opinion supports a rule 
that would equate statements imputing homosexuality with 
accusations of serious criminal conduct or insinuations that 
an individual has a loathsome disease.205 
2. Gay Panic Defenses
Criminal law also contains an example of the evolving 
background norms concerning homosexuality against which claims 
of coerced speech must be evaluated. Just as accusations of 
201. Holly Miller, Article, Homosexuality as Defamation: A Proposal for the Use of the
“Right-Thinking Minds” Approach in the Development of Modern Jurisprudence, 18 COMM. L. 
& POL’Y 349, 356 (2013) [hereinafter Homosexuality as Defamation]. 
202. Fogle, supra note 184, at 172 (citing LAURENCE ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
32–36 (1997)). 
203. Id. at 176.
204. Id. at 170; see also Homosexuality as Defamation, supra note 201, at 363–64 (reviewing
literature arguing that the need not to legitimate homophobia outweighs the harms to the plaintiff 
from being falsely labeled gay). 
205. Yonaty v. Mincolla, 945 N.Y.S.2d 774, 778–79 (App. Div. 2012).
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homosexuality were once deemed so outrageous as to be defamatory 
per se, being the focus of homosexual interest has been held by some 
courts as sufficient provocation to justify murder. 
As chronicled by Cynthia Lee, the label “homosexual panic” 
was first coined in 1920, and was listed in the 1952 edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual to describe latent homosexuals 
who experienced extreme anxiety in situations that stimulated their 
homosexual interest.206 While later discredited as a mental illness, 
the constellation resurfaced as an urban myth to plead mitigation or 
even exoneration on the grounds that “the victim’s (homo)sexual 
advance triggered in [the defendants] a violent psychotic reaction, 
causing them to lose control over their mental abilities.”207 These 
defenses, according to Lee, “have been relatively successful.”208 
The flavor of these cases can be found in People v. Cain.209 
Runcorn, a 73-year old geophysicist, was found dead in 1995. “A 
strap taken from one of Runcorn’s pieces of luggage was tied tightly 
around his neck. There were lacerations, abrasions, and bruising on 
his face, neck, ears, back of the head, and left shoulder, damage to 
the gums and tongue, and broken teeth.”210 Cain, the defendant, was 
a twenty-four year old competitive kickboxer whose pager was found 
under the victim’s bed. 
At trial Cain described the night’s events: 
Runcorn put his hands on Cain’s chest and pushed him 
down on the bed, saying something to the effect of, “You 
know you want it, you want to suck my dick.” Cain tried to 
leave, but Runcorn grabbed him by the shirt. From the look 
on Runcorn’s face, Cain feared he was going to be raped. 
He tried to break Runcorn’s hold on him by elbowing him 
and punching him in the face. When he saw Runcorn “ball 
up” in an aggressive stance, Cain claimed everything “went 
black,” and he experienced a “black rage” as the two of 
them fought. Cain recalled Runcorn slammed him into a 
chair and looked angry when he was holding onto Cain’s 
206. Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 482–83 (2008)
[hereinafter Gay Panic Defense]. 
207. Id. at 491. See Michael A. Smyth, Queers and Provocateurs: Hegemony, Ideology, and
the “Homosexual Advance” Defense, 40 L. & SOC. REV. 903, 906 (2006). 
208. Gay Panic Defense, supra note 206, at 478.
209. No. D036023, 2002 WL 1767583 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2002).
210. Id. at *1.
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leg as he tried to leave. When he regained control of 
himself, Cain said he found Runcorn lying on the floor with 
a strap tied around his neck. Cain could not recall using the 
strap.211 
This tale was sufficient to help get his conviction reduced from 
an initial charge of first-degree murder, carrying a twenty-five year 
sentence, to second degree and fifteen years. While the jury seemed 
receptive to this story of the innocent victim needing to put down the 
homosexual predator, for most people the thought that a young 
experienced martial artist would be unable to escape an unwelcome 
sexual advance from someone fifty years older would be incredible. 
Cain is not an isolated instance of odd decisions by juries: 
On February 28, 2003, a Cobb County jury acquitted 
Roderiqus Reshad Reed of the May 2001 brutal murder and 
robbery of [Ahmed] Dabarran despite Reed’s own 
admission at trial that he repeatedly struck [Ahmed] on the 
head with a pot in [Ahmed’s] home, and then left with the 
victim’s car, wallet, and cell phone. Reed’s attorneys used 
the “gay panic” defense alleging that Reed killed [Ahmed] 
to protect himself from unwanted sexual advances. 
However, a medical examiner testified that [Ahmed] was 
struck over a dozen times on the head while he slept.212 
In a case that received much media attention, fifteen-year old 
Lawrence King was shot in the back of the head by his classmate, 
who later claimed that King’s provocative behavior led him to 
commit the murder.213 
The gay panic defense ties into a generalized idea that gay 
sexuality, especially when turned toward heterosexuals, reasonably 
provokes extreme disgust and violence. The BBC was forced to 
apologize in 2009 after it treated the pending Ugandan legislation 
that would make gay acts a capital offense as a position on which 
211. Id. at *3.
212. Acquittal of Georgia Man’s Killer Sparks Candlelight Protest, GAY TODAY (Mar. 20,
2003), http://gaytoday.com/events/032003ev.asp. 
213. David Alan Perkiss, Comment, A New Strategy for Neutralizing the Gay Panic Defense
at Trial: Lessons from the Lawrence King Case, 60 UCLA L. REV. 778, 792 (2013) (“Thus, the 
defense argued gay panic at trial: By painting a picture of King as a sexual aggressor and 
McInerney as the emotionally troubled target of King's advances, [the defense attorney] 
attempted to garner sympathy for McInerney and argued that McInerney’s crime was voluntary 
manslaughter, not murder.”). 
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reasonable people could disagree.214 A recent documentary shows 
the Fort Worth, Texas, police chief offering as a reason for a 2009 
brutal raid on the Rainbow Lounge that patrons made suggestive 
gestures toward the officers.215 Because these ideas permeate society, 
the gay panic defense may strike jurors as a plausible description of 
events, one that warrants a lesser judgment against the murderers. 
This trend has not gone unopposed. The judge in the Matthew 
Shepard case refused to allow the defendants to plead gay panic.216 
In response to the murder of a transgender teen, then-governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger signed the Gwen Araujo Justice for Victims 
Act, which required that juries not consider bias based on sexual 
orientation.217 This first step was then followed in 2014 by Governor 
Jerry Brown signing Assembly Bill 2501, which “for purposes of 
determining sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation was 
not objectively reasonable . . . under circumstances in which the 
victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance 
towards the defendant.”218 Despite urging from the ABA that states 
enact legislation to curtail use of the gay panic defense,219 most states 
do not formally exclude the gay panic defense,220 leaving its 
admission to the individual judge’s discretion.221 
214. BBC Boss: Sorry for Online Debate on Killing Gays, PRIDESOURCE (Dec. 31, 2009),
http://www.pridesource.com/article.html?article=39331 (“Lynne Featherstone, an opposition 
lawmaker with the Liberal Democrats, said she was deeply offended that the BBC thought it 
legitimate to debate killing gays.”). 
215. RAID OF THE RAINBOW LOUNGE (Camina Entertainment 2012). To his credit, the Police
Chief later softened his characterization. 
216. Robert W. Black, Wyo. Judge Bars ‘Gay Panic’ Defense, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 1999),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/daily/nov99/shepard110199.htm. 
217. Gwen Araujo Justice for Victims Act, ch. 550, 2006 Cal. Stat. 3553.
218. Assemb. B. 2501, ch. 684, 2014 Cal. Stat. 95 (amending Cal. Penal Code § 192 (West
2014)). 
219. Report to House of Delegates Resolution 113A, ABA CRIM. JUST. SEC. (2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/abanews/1373479339_31_1_1_9_resolu
tion_summary.docx; see Terry Carter, “Gay Panic” Criminal Defense Strategies Should Be 
Curtailed by Legislation, ABA House Resolves, ABA J. (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.aba 
journal.com/news/article/resolution_on_gay_panic. 
220. In New Jersey, the legislature introduced Bill A4083 to ban the gay panic defense,
although it remains in committee. Assemb. 4083, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2015), http://www 
.njleg.state .nj.us/2014/Bills/A4500/4083_I1.PDF. 
221. Cynthia Lee believes that the panic defense should be permitted, because otherwise
“[d]isallowing defendants from arguing gay panic simply forces such arguments underground and 
into the subconscious where stereotypes about gay men as deviant sexual predators, and norms 
that favor heterosexuality over homosexuality, are likely to have greater impact.” Gay Panic 
Defense, supra note 206, at 536. 
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3. Summary
Defendants such as Elane Photography and Masterpiece argue 
that the nondiscrimination laws they are charged with violating 
compel them to communicate messages of support for same-sex 
marriage against their religious objections. While the courts have 
soundly rejected this argument, to the extent communicating a 
message is a sociological fact to be investigated rather than a legal 
claim to be vetted in the abstract, the defendants’ position may 
deserve more attention than ordinarily allowed. Against a 
background of societal disapproval of homosexuality, actions that 
treat gays and lesbians as ordinary folk does send a signal of 
tolerance and perhaps even approval; in an environment of social 
acceptance of gay couples, however, providing services for same-sex 
weddings sends no particular message about the business transaction. 
The parties in suits such as those represented by Elane Photography 
and Masterpiece differ on the more accurate description of the 
background social norms, and thus of the communicative signal from 
providing wedding services. 
Supporting the defendants’ point of view is the fact that in both 
the civil and criminal laws, homosexuality has a history of not only 
being criminalized itself, but of creating legal rules that assume that 
even the idea of same-sex intimacy is sufficiently shocking that its 
suggestion rises to per se defamation, or a justification for murder in 
the gay panic defense. Favoring the plaintiffs is that all three of these 
points have seen improvement in recent years: Sodomy became legal 
after Lawrence v. Texas222 in 2003 and the trend is resolutely in the 
direction of holding that calling someone “gay” is not defamatory at 
all, or at least not defamatory per se. And while gay panic remains a 
viable defense in most jurisdictions, formal efforts have gained 
traction to remove it from the kinds of provocation that will excuse 
the murder of a gay victim. Throughout society, “gay” no longer 
carries a negative moral connotation to the extent seen in earlier 
times. Using social survey data from 1973 through 1998, Loftus was 
able to conclude that while negativity toward homosexuality 
increased through 1990, thereafter “attitudes have become 
increasingly liberal.”223 
222. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
223. Jeni Loftus, America’s Liberalization in Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, 66 AM. SOC.
REV. 762, 762 (2001). A summary of polling data is available in Karlyn Bowman, Andrew Rugg, 
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This improvement, however, has not gone so far as to remove 
the need for protections against lingering prejudice. “Americans have 
become more tolerant of gay people than ever before, but this 
tolerance has definite limits.”224 Recently a California lawyer 
attempted to put on the ballot a Sodomite Suppression Act 
“mandating, among other things, that any person who has sexual 
relations with someone of the same gender be ‘put to death by bullets 
to the head.’”225 Even while gay men and women are receiving new 
rights at unprecedented rates, sexual orientation remains second only 
to race as the cause of hate crimes.226 
[A]t the same time that all the great strides have occurred,
discrimination, violence, and tragic horror stories—in
addition to the daily slights that all of us who are gay,
lesbian, bisexual, or transgender have experienced for
years—have not only continued, they’ve sometimes become
more blatant. Rather than dissipating, reports of violence
against LGBT people have surged, even in the most liberal,
gay-accepting cities, spiking 27% in New York City alone
from 2013 to 2014.227
The record is thus mixed, a mélange of ongoing antigay
prejudice in the midst of new rights and normalized social status for 
gays now able to serve openly in the military and get married. 
Whether servicing a same-sex wedding signals approval, therefore, 
will depend upon the community of “right-minded” persons 
& Jennifer Marsico, Polls on Attitudes on Homosexuality and Gay Marriage, AEI (Mar. 2013), 
http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/-polls-on-attitudes-on-homosexuality-gay 
-marriage_151640318614.pdf.
224. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
LAW 72 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2002). 
225. Adam Nagourney, Gays Targeted in a California Initiative, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/25/us/california-initiative-would-kill-gay-people.html?_r=0. 
Although state officials expressed skepticism concerning their ability to prevent the proposal 
going forward, a judicial order ruled it “patently unconstitutional on its face.” Hailey 
Branson-Potts, Judge Strikes Down Proposed “Sodomite Suppression Act” Calling for Killing of 
Gays, L.A. TIMES (June 23, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-antigay-sodo 
mite-suppression-act-struck-down-20150623-story.html; see Matthew S. Bajko (@politicalnotes), 
TWITTER (June 23, 2015, 12:53 PM), https://twitter.com/politicalnotes/status/6134348309198315 
52. 
226. Latest Hate Crime Statistics Report Released, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Dec.
8, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/december/latest-hate-crime-statistics-report 
-released (“Of the 5,922 single bias incidents reported, the top three bias categories were race
(48.5 percent), sexual orientation (20.8 percent), and religion (17.4 percent).”).
227. SIGNORILE, supra note 93, at 3 (citing data from the Anti-Violence Project).
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identified as recipients of the alleged message. Central to the analysis 
is the general reminder that it is the “role of tort law . . . to make the 
injured whole, not to change social mores.”228 We are not interested 
in describing the social world we would like to find, but the world in 
which the parties to the suit actually exist. We must be open in all 
good faith to the possibility that the defendants are justified in their 
coerced speech argument if we wish to have confidence in the result 
should we ultimately reject it. 
IV. FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS
A. The Legal Background
Despite the possible importance of other claims, the marquee 
complaint is that enforcing nondiscrimination laws against public 
businesses infringes their right to the free exercise of religion. Before 
Hobby Lobby, this assertion would have been received with great 
skepticism by the courts. Leading up to that controversial case, a 
different decision, United States v. Lee,229 “had appeared to lay down 
a hard and fast rule that business entry constituted a form of waiver 
of religious objection to general business regulation.”230 Lee 
involved an Amish employer who refused to pay social security taxes 
for his Amish employees.231 Although the U.S. Code makes a 
religious exemption from these taxes for the self-employed,232 Lee 
could not claim this relief because he had employees; if he were to 
be granted an exemption, it would need to come from the 
Constitution.233 The Court found no such requirement. “When 
followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a 
matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a 
matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the 
statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.”234 
Following Lee, businesses were expected to follow the laws and 
regulations imposed upon everyone else in that situation, whatever 
their private religious convictions. 
228. Arend, supra note 196, at 112.
229. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
230. Moving Targets, supra note 109, at 64–65.
231. Lee, 455 U.S. at 254.
232. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (2012).
233. Lee, 455 U.S. at 256.
234. Id. at 261.
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The track of judicial pronouncements on free exercise rights is 
not a topic for the timid. The main trunk of the story begins in the 
nineteenth century when, in Reynolds v. United States,235 the 
Supreme Court held that “[l]aws are made for the government of 
actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief 
and opinions, they may with practices.”236 From the beginning of the 
Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment’s religion clauses, 
then, the thrust was to avoid civil anarchy by restricting 
constitutional protection from legal interference to the right of belief, 
but less to the right of action.237 The severity of this initial distinction 
between belief and conduct would later be softened. Several decades 
later, the Court recognized that the free exercise of religion was not 
limited to belief, but included a presumptive right to adhere to 
religious norms through conduct: Observance of a Saturday Sabbath 
as in Sherbert v. Verner,238 and education and upbringing of Amish 
children as in Wisconsin v. Yoder.239 But the belief-conduct 
distinction roared back in Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,240 which held that the 
government may prohibit religiously motivated conduct through 
“neutral law[s] of general applicability.” Although Smith is subject to 
varying interpretations, under its most vigorous reading it holds that 
the Free Exercise Clause prohibits only those regulations of 
conduct that single out or target conduct motivated by religious 
belief—as they found to be case in Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.241 In effect, the constitutional objection 
is to the state’s focus on belief, not the state’s incidental impact on 
conduct.242 
While Lee had earlier announced this standard uncontroversially 
in the commercial context, Smith expanded it broadly to include 
individuals. Even if, “in reality, Smith really just changed the 
phrasing of the doctrine of the free exercise clause to reflect the 
235. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
236. Id. at 166.
237. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166–67 (“Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of
his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief 
superior to the law of the land, and in effect permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”). 
238. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
239. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
240. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
241. 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Same-Sex-Marriage, supra note 122, at 214.
242. Id.
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actual pattern of decisions,”243 popular opinion only then noticed 
how greatly judicial rules differed from its own understanding of the 
meaning of free exercise rights. The nation was shocked, and the 
reaction was vigorous.244 
First Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA),245 which had the goal “to restore the compelling interest 
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner[246] and Wisconsin v. Yoder[247] 
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of 
religion is substantially burdened.”248 The law, however, was 
declared unconstitutional as applied to the states in Flores,249 
prompting several states to enact their own versions of the law.250 
For suits at the federal level, the compelling interest test remains. 
Under that standard plaintiffs must first demonstrate the existence of 
a burden on a sincerely held central tenet of religious belief, thereby 
requiring the government next to argue that the burden furthers a 
compelling interest in the least restrictive manner.251 At the state 
level, however, most jurisdictions still fall under the Smith rule, 
which finds no free exercise harm if the burden is caused by a rule of 
general applicability.252 If the state does have its own version of the 
federal RFRA, the criteria become more variable. 
As a technical matter, then, without a state RFRA law it would 
be difficult to argue any free exercise complaint.253 The business 
must show under the Smith standard that the nondiscrimination law it 
is violating is not a “neutral law of general applicability,” an 
understandably difficult case to make. Three states with published 
243. Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion Is Not a Basis for Harming Others,
GEO. L. J. (forthcoming 2015–16), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2654487. 
244. See id.
245. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
246. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
247. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
248. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b)(1).
249. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1977).
250. As of 2015, twenty-one states have enacted state versions of RFRA. State Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (June 5, 2015), http://www.ncsl 
.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [hereinafter State Religious 
Freedom]. 
251. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566 (1993).
252. State Religious Freedom, supra note 250.
253. According to Christopher Lund, state RFRA laws have been largely ineffective at their
intended purpose to expand free exercise protections. Christopher Lund, Religious Liberty After 
Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 467 (2010) (“[I]n many states, state 
RFRAs seem to exist almost entirely on the books.”). 
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court decisions between wedding service providers and same-sex 
couples—Colorado (Masterpiece), Oregon (Klein), and New Jersey 
(Ocean Grove Camp Meeting)—have no RFRA statutes. A fourth, 
New Mexico, has such a law, which the court in Elane Photography 
declined to address because its version of RFRA does not apply to 
disputes between private individuals.254 We therefore have limited 
insight into the probable success of such complaints under the 
RFRA-required Sherbert compelling interest test.255 
For about fifteen years this was the legal landscape. But Hobby 
Lobby changed matters, although there is disagreement whether the 
changes are more legal or political.256 Litigated under the federal 
RFRA rules, the facts involved the Affordable Care Act’s 
contraceptive mandate, which required employers to cover birth 
control costs in insurance plans with no co-pay for the employee. 
Hobby Lobby, a closely-held craft store, claimed that because the 
family owners’ religious beliefs deemed such services to be the 
equivalent of abortion, the mandate violated the company’s religious 
liberties. The major outcome for present purposes is the holding that 
commercial enterprises can claim religious beliefs.257 This outcome 
appears to upend Lee, and although the decision itself explicitly says 
that it does not provide a shield to evade nondiscrimination 
requirements under the guise of religious freedom,258 Hobby Lobby 
has been read by businesses like Masterpiece as supporting the 
254. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 76–77 (N.M. 2013).
255. Moving Targets, supra note 109, at 57 (“The case has yet to arise that presents the
perfect conflict between strong vendor-supportive norms of religious exemption, and strong 
consumer-supportive norms of anti-discrimination.”). 
256. Id. at 3 (“My overarching thesis is that the political impact of Hobby Lobby may be
much greater than its legal impact.”). 
257. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (“we hold that a
federal regulation’s restriction on the activities of a for-profit closely held corporation must 
comply with RFRA.”). For a summary of the case holdings, see Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and 
the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 35, 75 (2015) 
[hereinafter Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions]. First, is a for-profit corporation a 
“person” who can “exercise religion” within the meaning of RFRA? [YES] Second, if so, does 
the mandate to include all forms of pregnancy prevention services in health insurance 
“substantially burden” the firm’s religious exercise? [YES] Third, if so, is application of that 
burden to the firm “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest”? [ASSUMED] Fourth, 
if so, is the requirement of such coverage in the employer-purchased health coverage “the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [NO]. 
258. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (“The principal dissent raises the possibility that
discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice 
to escape legal sanction. Our decision today provides no such shield.”). 
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position that their own religious preferences should receive similar 
exemption from general laws.259 
B. The Argument
Against this background of free exercise jurisprudence, 
businesses like Elane Photography and Masterpiece seek to assert 
their religious liberty claims to secure exemption from 
nondiscrimination laws. To argue under the federal Constitution’s 
Smith standard, which “does not require the accommodation of 
commercial or public actors who have religious objections to serving 
same-sex couples,” the parties “would need to show that 
anti-discrimination rules from which they seek exemption are not 
‘neutral, generally applicable regulatory law[s].’”260 
Masterpiece attempted such an argument, claiming that because 
the law “provides exemptions for ‘places principally used for 
religious purposes’” but not for Masterpiece, the law is not generally 
applicable.261 The court was unpersuaded: “A law need not apply to 
every individual and entity to be generally applicable; rather, it is 
generally applicable so long as it does not regulate only religiously 
motivated conduct.”262 CADA does not limit the exercise of religion. 
The law’s exemptions are a commonplace means to “reduce legal 
burdens on religious organizations and comport with the free 
exercise doctrine.”263 Masterpiece would have had a stronger 
argument had CADA exempted secular organizations from its 
application, but that was not the case.264 
The court followed a similar analysis in Elane Photography, and 
we can expect that anyone attempting to characterize 
nondiscrimination ordinances as targeting religious faith while 
exempting secular beliefs, or even preferring one religious form over 
another, will be similarly unsuccessful. For that reason, disputes in 
259. Id. at 2759.
260. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 95, at 287 (citations omitted).
261. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. 14CA1351, 2015 COA 115, at *48–49 (Colo.
App. Aug. 13, 2015). 
262. Id. at *49.
263. Id. at *49–50.
264. Masterpiece proceeds to offer a different argument under the “hybrid” rights claims
described by Smith. Masterpiece, 2015 COA 115, at *53–55. This doctrine, however, has been 
severely criticized, and characterized as mere dicta. See Grace United Methodist Church 
v. Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 656 (10th Cir. 2006). Consequently this strategy was given short
shrift by the court, and will not be discussed here.
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non-RFRA states are likely to enjoy no better success than these 
early attempts. More ambiguous, however, are the probable results of 
similar cases in states with RFRA laws that require a weighing of the 
relative burdens and interests in enforcement of the 
nondiscrimination laws. While no such case has yet presented itself, 
we can give some consideration to the nature of the burdens borne by 
each of the parties. 
V. BURDENS
In most instances, the demand for a free exercise exception is 
neither neutral in terms of costs imposed, nor does it take care to 
restrict those costs to those enjoying the exception. “[T]here is not a 
single ‘religious liberty’ claim that does not involve abridging 
someone else’s rights.”265 Rational limits to free exercise protection 
claims require that any inconveniences or costs arising from 
exemptions from general laws be placed on the believer rather than 
on society.266 
Legal analysis on the merits of granting religious exemptions 
has been sensitive to the need to avoid shifting burdens onto 
third parties. Any such shift raises potential Establishment Clause 
worries as the cost of one person’s religious observances is paid by 
nonbelievers.267 
There was very good reason, [then], for the earlier 
consensus that owners of for-profit businesses must comply 
with secular laws regardless of their religious beliefs. In the 
commercial context, religious exemptions will almost 
always impose burdens on third parties, whether employees, 
customers, or business competitors. As a result, such 
exemptions implicate a rule “with a long history in 
libertarian thought”—that rights are limited by the need for 
“prevention of tangible harm to specifiable others without 
their consent.”268 
265. MICHAELSON, supra note 14, at 27.
266. See James M. Donovan, Restoring Free Exercise Protections by Limiting Them:
Preventing a Repeat of Smith, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (1996). 
267. Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, supra note 257, at 77 (“[T]he
Establishment Clause requires a construction of RFRA that does not permit the imposition of 
significant harms on third parties.”). 
268. Oleske, supra note 127, at 132 (quoting Mark Galanter).
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Several Supreme Court opinions underscore this sensitivity 
to the proper placement of any costs, including Lee269 and Prince 
v. Massachusetts.270 According to some of its supporters, RFRA rests
on the same expectation that “government should not restrict
religious practice, including that of minority and politically
powerless religions, unless the practice in question causes a direct,
individualized harm to specifically identifiable, non-consenting third
parties or a serious threat to public health, safety and order.”271 As
Oleske explains, Hobby Lobby ended as it did because the majority
was able to persuade its more cautious members that this principle of
nondisplacement of costs would be respected:
The Court emphasized that, because the government had 
already developed an accommodation for religious 
nonprofit organizations that ensured their female employees 
would receive full contraceptive coverage direct from 
insurers, the accommodation could be extended to Hobby 
Lobby with “precisely zero” effect on its female employees. 
And Justice Kennedy, who provided the fifth vote for the 
majority opinion, explained in a separate concurrence that 
religious liberty rights cannot be permitted to “unduly 
269. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (“Granting an exemption from social
security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the 
employees.”). 
270. 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Religious activities which concern
only members of the faith are and ought to be free—as nearly absolutely free as anything can be. 
But beyond these, many religious denominations or sects engage in collateral and secular 
activities intended to obtain means from unbelievers to sustain the worshippers and their 
leaders . . . . [L]imits begin to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide with liberties 
of others or of the public.”); see Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 25, 53 (2015). 
Court precedent gives the principle against burden shifting the force of law. In Estate 
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.[, 472 US 703 (1985)], for instance, the Court reasoned that 
“[t]he First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own 
interests others must conform to his own religious necessities.” And in Cutter 
v. Wilkinson[, 544 US 709 (2005)], the Court returned to that principle, holding that in
applying voluntary accommodations, “courts must take adequate account of the
burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries . . . .”
Id. (citations omitted). 
271. Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994) [hereinafter What Hath Congress 
Wrought?]. 
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restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their 
own interests, interests the laws deems compelling.”272 
Any exemption from nondiscrimination laws for merchants will 
undermine this standard expectation that costs for religious 
exceptionalism will not be allocated to those outside the faith, 
creating a threefold challenge. The first two are to describe, 
respectively, the self-imposed burdens on merchants who seek to run 
their public accommodations according to private and exclusionary 
religious principles, and the costs transferred onto third parties 
seeking only to transact the advertised business but who are refused 
for failing to satisfy those exclusionary principles. The third task will 
be to weigh these two burdens against one another. 
A. On Merchants
No one doubts that business owners who testify that serving a 
segment of the population will violate religious principles will incur 
a personal cost if forced to do so. Under the rule of Thomas 
v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division,273
religious beliefs are not to be scrutinized by the court before they are
recognized as worthy of receiving First Amendment protections.274 If
such declarations of faith are to be taken on their face as sincerely
held central tenets of religious belief, then it necessarily follows that
being required to act contrary to that belief will be a burdensome
duty.
In the context of denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples, 
Kim Davis, the clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky, has spoken in the 
strongest terms of what she feels to be at stake: 
To issue a marriage license which conflicts with God’s 
definition of marriage, with my name affixed to the 
certificate, would violate my conscience. It is not a light 
issue for me. It is a Heaven or Hell decision. For me it is a 
decision of obedience. I have no animosity toward anyone 
272. Oleske, supra note 127, at 133–34 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751, 2791 (2014)). 
273. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
274. See id. at 714 (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”). 
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and harbor no ill will. To me this has never been a gay or 
lesbian issue. It is about marriage and God’s Word.275 
Given the presumed sincerity of the belief and the great 
magnitude of the perceived penalty of violating that belief, attention 
shifts to the countervailing need to demand such a cost. The only 
guidance on this point that we presently have comes from the history 
of enforcement of nondiscrimination laws in the face of religious 
beliefs concerning the inferiority of the nonwhite races. When 
confronted with the question of whether a restaurant could refuse to 
serve African Americans because of the owner’s religious beliefs, the 
Supreme Court rejected that argument: 
Neither is the court impressed by defendant Bessinger’s 
contention that the judicial enforcement of the public 
accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
upon which this suit is predicated violates the free exercise 
of his religious beliefs in contravention of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution. It is unquestioned that the 
First Amendment prohibits compulsion by law of any creed 
or the practice of any form of religion, but it also safeguards 
the free exercise of one’s chosen religion. The free exercise 
of one’s beliefs, however, as distinguished from the 
absolute right to a belief, is subject to regulation when 
religious acts require accommodation to society. 
Undoubtedly defendant Bessinger has a constitutional right 
to espouse the religious beliefs of his own choosing, 
however, he does not have the absolute right to exercise and 
practice such beliefs in utter disregard of the clear 
constitutional rights of other citizens. This court refuses to 
lend credence or support to his position that he has a 
constitutional right to refuse to serve members of the Negro 
race in his business establishments upon the ground that to 
do so would violate his sacred religious beliefs.276 
In this holding we find the themes discussed earlier: the 
belief-conduct dichotomy that originated in Reynolds, and the need 
to avoid externalizing the burden of complying with religious beliefs 
275. Kim Davis, Statement of Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis, LIBERTY COUNSEL (Sept. 1, 2015),
https://www.lc.org/newsroom/details/statement-of-kentucky-clerk-kim-davis. 
276. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.S.C. 1966), rev’d 377
F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
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onto outsiders. If courts follow this precedent, pleas to avoid 
nondiscrimination laws protecting sexual orientation on account of 
religious beliefs will receive the same chilly reception as those 
seeking to avoid nondiscrimination laws protecting race due to 
religious beliefs. 
While that would appear to conclude the matter, some would 
insist that racial discrimination is not comparable to sexual 
orientation prejudice, and that laws forbidding the first should not be 
extended to encompass the second. There exists much disagreement 
over the extent to which racial prejudice and its social history serves 
as an appropriate analogy for sexual orientation discrimination, and 
whether we should expect to expand the holdings that protect against 
racial discrimination to protect gays.277 On the one hand, the 
similarities seem hard to overlook. The refusal of state officials in 
Kentucky to perform their duties regarding same-sex couples, for 
example, echoes the refusal of a Louisiana justice of the peace to 
officiate the wedding ceremony for an interracial couple.278 Loving 
v. Virginia,279 which struck down the nation’s laws against interracial
marriage, offers an obvious similarity to Obergefell, which struck
down the laws preventing same-sex marriage.
On the other side, however, Brownstein argues, “Racial 
discrimination provides an inappropriate analogy, because racism 
plays such a uniquely invidious role in U.S. history.”280 Dent agrees 
concerning “the unique enormity of racial discrimination in 
American history,” and deems the “[d]iscrimination against 
homosexuals . . . not of equal magnitude.”281 Finally, others seek a 
middle course, arguing that “it is far from clear that the exceptional 
nature of the nation’s struggle for racial equality should lead courts 
to treat race as occupying a sui generis constitutional category into 
which entry is barred for all other victims of discrimination. The 
more fitting approach might well be to honor that original struggle 
277. For an overview of this question, see Curtis, supra note 38, at 209 (“The best way to
think about the claim that gay marriage requires expanded exemptions from existing laws for 
religious discriminators is in the larger context of both race and gender discrimination.”). 
278. 2009 Louisiana Interracial Marriage Incident, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/2009_Louisiana_interracial_marriage_incident (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
279. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
280. Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for
Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry, 45 
U. S.F. L. REV. 389, 414 (2010). 
281. Dent, supra note 91, at 618.
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for civil rights by giving full force to its lessons in other relevant 
areas.”282 
On one point at least, the histories of mistreatment of African 
Americans and of gays are almost identical in that religious belief 
has served to promote both forms of prejudice.283 Just as Obergefell 
provoked a visceral antagonism, the response to Brown v. Board of 
Education284 “was almost psychotic,”285 and in that case, as in the 
present one, the “most common argument of the dissenters was 
theological: integration encouraged miscegenation, which 
contradicted divine Word.”286 In each case the proponents of 
discrimination attempted to buttress their positions by arguing that 
“such relationships are not ‘natural,’ and thus may be legitimately 
prohibited, [and this] is ‘perhaps the most striking parallel between 
the rhetoric of interracial marriage opponents and the rhetoric of 
opponents of same-sex marriage.’”287 Whatever their differences 
in many other ways, it would be difficult to maintain that 
religious-based discrimination against homosexuals should be 
exempted from general antidiscrimination laws, but religious-based 
discrimination against miscegenation should not. 
B. On Same-Sex Couples
The formal analysis under the Sherbert test required by most 
RFRA laws does not directly require identification of the burdens 
imposed on the party experiencing the discrimination. After a burden 
on the discriminator’s religious beliefs has been shown, attention 
would then shift to the governmental interest in enforcing the law, 
and whether the means chosen is the least restrictive available. We 
have two related reasons, however, to focus on the costs borne by the 
same-sex couple rather than on the technically necessary interests of 
the government. First, to a large extent, this debate is waged in the 
282. Oleske, supra note 127, at 120–21.
283. See, e.g., STEPHEN R. HAYNES, NOAH’S CURSE: THE BIBLICAL JUSTIFICATION OF
AMERICAN SLAVERY 8 (2002) (“By the 1830s . . . the scriptural defense of slavery had evolved 
into the ‘most elaborate and systematic statement’ of proslavery theory.”). 
284. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
285. MARK ETHRIDGE, A CALL TO THE SOUTH 13 (Nieman Rep. 9 Apr. 1959).
286. Jane Dailey, Sex, Segregation, and the Sacred After Brown, 91 J. AM. HIST. 119, 126
(2004). 
287. Oleske, supra note 127, at 118 (quoting Aderson Bellegarde François, To Go into Battle
with Space and Time: Emancipated Slave Marriage, Interracial Marriage, and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 105, 119–20 (2009)). 
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popular imagination and on social media. While there have been 
quite a few complaints, only a small number go through the process 
of full litigation. In the meantime, sides are chosen, attitudes formed, 
and positions taken based on lay characterizations of the conflict. 
Looking at the costs to victims in the same way we look at burdens 
on discriminators thus respects the conflict’s framing in public fora. 
Second, while this alternative view does not inquire into the 
government’s interest specifically, it does view it through the eyes of 
the persons the government seeks to protect. In that light, the 
question becomes, “Protect from what?” If there is a compelling 
interest in shielding gay men and lesbians from the vagaries of 
bigotry in the public arena, it must be because if that action is not 
taken they are exposed to a significant injury. If there were no 
cognizable harm, there can be no compelling interest. Looking at the 
burdens inflicted on customers excluded from the marketplace, then, 
will be an essential first step should later proceedings ask the 
question concerning governmental interests. For that reason, this 
section looks not at the formal arguments of governmental interests 
in promoting equality, but instead at the prior issue of the harms 
inflicted when such equality does not exist. 
When examining the costs imposed upon same-sex couples, the 
general trend of commentators has been to suggest that these slights 
are but minor inconveniences—nothing more burdensome than 
finding another dress shop or cake baker, when compared to the 
violation of conscience risked by the merchants. “Proponents of 
exemptions have typically framed religious objectors’ compliance 
with LGBT antidiscrimination laws as pitting one person’s religious 
conscience against another person’s mere inconvenience and mild 
sense of offense.”288 Examples include: 
• “This omission threatens serious harm to a religious
minority while conferring no real benefits on same-sex
couples. Same-sex couples will rarely if ever actually want
such personalized services from providers who
fundamentally disapprove of their relationship, and they will
288. Marvin Lim & Louise Melling, Inconvenience or Indignity? Religious Exemptions to
Public Accommodation Laws, 22 J. L. & POL’Y 705, 707 (2014). 
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nearly always be able to readily obtain these services from 
others who are happy to serve them.”289 
• Koppelman believes that “the burden on [the discriminating
business] outweighs the burden on” the gay couple . . . .
“[Elane Photography’s] Willock had no difficulty finding
another photographer in Albuquerque . . . . On the other
hand, assuming that Huguenin’s religious beliefs really
forbid her to photograph same-sex weddings, the court’s
decision might mean that she must abandon her business.”290
• “The same-sex spouse who asks a department store
employee for assistance in buying a suit for his wedding and
the same-sex couple who orders a wedding cake from a
small bakery will often have alternative choices available to
them to obtain the goods and services they are seeking.”291
• “What’s the balance of burdens in these cases? The
discrimination involved here doesn’t plausibly deny the gay
couples effective civic equality: There are plenty of bakers
and photographers who would be only too happy to take
their money.”292
• “In New Mexico, there was no evidence that Vanessa
Willock and her partner incurred any costs in finding
another wedding photographer.”293
There are two fundamental errors in such statements. The first is 
factual. Any claim that shoppers can easily go from one merchant to 
another assumes an underlying fungibility, that the good or service 
being denied the same-sex couple is indistinguishable from a similar 
goods or services elsewhere. In that view, the only harm endured is 
the inconvenience of going to the next bakery to order the wedding 
cake. The second error is that it overlooks the real dignitary harms 
that arise from identity-based discrimination in the public 
marketplace. 
289. Douglas Laycock, Re: SB 0010, Religious Liberty Implications of Same-Sex Marriage,
U. VA. SCH. L. (Mar. 12, 2013), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/Illinois-republicans-2013
.pdf.
290. Gay Rights, supra note 79, at 629.
291. Brownstein, supra note 280, at 416.
292. Conor Friedersdorf, Should Mom-and-Pops That Forgo Gay Weddings Be Destroyed?,
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/should-busin 
esses-that-quietly-oppose-gay-marriage-be-destroyed/389489. 
293. Same-Sex-Marriage, supra note 122, at 207.
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1. Assumed Fungibility of Goods and Services
Although many assume the interchangeability of goods and 
services, that belief does not describe market practices. Bakers rarely 
advertise their confections as indistinguishable from the cakes and 
cookies available from the grocery store or other bakeries. No one 
puts a sign in their window saying, “Our cakes are no better than 
what you’ll get at the chain grocery.” More representative are the 
boasts by Sweet Cakes by Melissa, the Oregon bakery fined 
$135,000 for refusing to sell a wedding cake to a lesbian couple.294 
She posted on her website that “[w]hen you order a cake from us you 
are getting the best quality ingredients for such a wonderful price. 
Our prices almost beat anyones [sic].”295 As a rule, all services are 
advertised as unique in either quality or price, such that an alternative 
is presumptively inferior in some way. This assessment may not be 
objectively true, but if we take the businesses at their own words, 
customers who are turned away suffer a measurable deprivation 
when they cannot obtain items from the preferred provider. As 
Brownstein wryly notes, anyone believing “that all caterers are 
comparable in cost, menu, and quality has never arranged a wedding 
reception or bar mitzvah.”296 
We should also consider that such writers might suffer from a 
lack of imagination. Assuming an availability of alternative sources 
of equivalent quality and value might simply reflect the speaker’s 
privileged urban environment in which a plethora of shops compete 
in the same business niche. More rural settings might have only one 
wedding dress boutique, and both bakers might be members of the 
same fundamentalist church. To design a legal rule that ignores the 
range of community resources available to the same-sex couple is 
one unlikely to address the underlying issues.297 The common law 
294. In re Melissa Elaine Klein, Nos. 44-14 & 45-14, 2015 WL 4503460 (Or. Div. of Fin. &
Corp. Sec. July 2, 2015). 
295. SWEETCAKES, http://www.sweetcakesweb.com/4.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
296. Brownstein, supra note 280, at 419.
297. Laycock suggests an exception to the exemption if the refusal imposes what he would
deem a significant burden on the rejected customer. Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 189, 199 (Douglas Laycock et al. 
eds., 2008) (“Hardship is obvious when there is only one or a few relevant merchants in a 
community and none of them will serve same-sex couples. In that case . . . the merchant’s right to 
moral integrity is outweighed by the same-sex couples’ right to live in the community in 
accordance with their moral commitments.”) (emphasis in original). This suggestion, however, 
seems only to invite yet more litigation to decide whether a hardship is sufficiently burdensome. 
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has not ordinarily allowed the availability of alternative 
establishments to release a merchant from the duty to provide 
services.298 
In any event, pointing out the availability of alternative service 
providers misses the primary injury inflicted when an unsuspecting 
consumer is told that she is inherently reprehensible to the clerk and 
will find no assistance there: 
The question is not whether one can find a store willing to 
let you in and treat you with dignity. The question is 
whether one has right to enter stores without worrying 
about such things . . . . The question is whether a 
storeowner has a right, in a free and democratic society, to 
treat a customer like a pariah. The answer is no.299 
Acts of discrimination send a pernicious message concerning the 
social value of the rejected patron. 
A person’s relationship with the community can be altered 
with respect to equal citizenship even if adequate 
alternative venues exist . . . . A fundamental insight of 
antidiscrimination law is that equal citizenship in a 
community can be infringed not just by government 
discrimination, but also by exclusion from 
nongovernmental public accommodations that is tolerated 
by a legal regime.300  
As portrayed in a particularly vivid example, “the hardship Jackie 
Robinson suffered when on the road with the Dodgers was not an 
inability to find some hotel that would have him; it was the indignity 
of not being allowed to stay in the same hotel as his white 
teammates.”301 The courts, then, should not bother with trivial issues 
such as available alternatives, but focus directly on the dignitary 
injuries inflicted by intentional acts of public discrimination. 
298. Even in the early English cases on public accommodations such as Lane v. Cotton, 88
ENG. REP. 1458 (K.B. 1701), “the existence of competition does not immunize innkeepers from 
their common-law obligations.” No Right to Exclude, supra note 51, at 1306. 
299. We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here, supra note 71, at 938, 941 (emphasis in original).
300. Tebbe, supra note 270, at 38, 39.
301. Oleske, supra note 127, at 138.
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2. Dignitary Harms Inflicted by Identity-Based Prejudice
Besides the inaccurate assumption that all goods and services 
are equivalent and fungible so that being denied the product of your 
choice inflicts no cognizable injury, a second error arises from the 
facile mischaracterization of the only harm inflicted on same-sex 
couples as nothing more than the time and effort to go down the 
street to a different baker. Speakers can be cavalier in their opinions 
that persons turned out of a store for no better reason than their 
personal identities feel nothing more than a mild pique at the need to 
find a different shop. But these are real people planning for what 
society deems one of the most significant milestones in life, who 
unexpectedly find this uniquely special event denigrated by the 
prejudices of a merchant they contacted to discuss an economic 
opportunity and not to exchange religious opinions. As but one 
example, even when otherwise recognizing that the harm from 
“being turned away . . . should not be lightly dismissed,” Robin 
Wilson herself trivializes those harms when she describes the 
“dignitary interests of same-sex couples [as the right] not to be 
embarrassed, not to be inconvenienced, not to have their choice 
questioned.”302 
Contrary to such petty characterizations, the severity of injury to 
personal dignity was recognized in the legislative history of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act:  
The primary purpose of [the Civil Rights Act], then, is to 
solve this problem, the deprivation of personal dignity that 
surely accompanies denials of equal access to public 
establishments. Discrimination is not simply dollars and 
cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, 
frustration, and embarrassment that a person must surely 
feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of 
the public.303  
“Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education,[304] the Supreme 
Court has consistently understood the harm to dignity that 
302. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the
Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 
77, 100–01 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
303. Senate Commerce Committee Report on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, S. REP. NO. 88-
872, at 16 (1964). 
304. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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discrimination causes, and recognized it to be distinct from the more 
‘tangible’ harm of being unable to access a particular benefit or 
entitlement.”305 Cases reflecting this principle include Heart of 
Atlanta Motel v. United States,306 Curtis v. Loether,307 Roberts 
v. United States Jaycees,308 and J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.309
Although these earlier cases dealt specifically with the dignitary
injuries due to race, the underlying reasoning was extended to
include LGBT persons in United States v. Windsor.310
While gesturing broadly to the insult such bigotry inflicts, we 
can attempt to specify the magnitude of the injury. Within 
international law, at least, dignity is the fount of all the human 
rights.311 Beginning with the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, which begins with the pronouncement that “recognition of 
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world,”312 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,313 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
305. Lim & Melling, supra note 288, at 712.
306. 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (“The Senate Commerce Committee made it quite clear that
the fundamental object of Title II was to vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely 
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.’”) (citation omitted). 
307. 415 U.S. 189, 195 n.10 (1974) (“[I]t has been suggested that ‘under the logic of the
common law development of a law of insult and indignity, racial discrimination might be treated 
as a dignitary tort.’”) (citation omitted). 
308. 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (“[D]iscrimination based on archaic and overbroad
assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces individuals to labor under 
stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual abilities. It thereby both 
deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide participation 
in political, economic, and cultural life.”). 
309. 511 U.S. 127, 153 (1993) (“The injury is to personal dignity and to the individual’s right
to participate in the political process.”). 
310. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (“DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of
state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality, 
not for other reasons like governmental efficiency. Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the 
dignity and integrity of the person.”). 
311. Philosopher Jeremy Waldron surveys the sundry versions of this assertion, and while he
finds that the claim of a foundational role for dignity as the source of human rights can be 
problematic in some versions, depending on the context, as a general conclusion he finds that 
“some such claim is true and helpful.” Jeremy Waldron, Is Dignity the Foundation of Human 
Rights?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 117, 137 (Rowan Cruft, S. 
Matthew Liao, & Massimo Renzo eds., 2015). 
312. G.A. Res. 217 (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948).
313. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Preamble, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 172. 
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Social and Cultural Rights,314 add to that statement that “these rights 
derive from the inherent dignity of the human.”315 
If we accept this characterization of the role of human dignity in 
justifying a scheme of inalienable and intrinsic rights that no 
sovereign civil or religious authority can ignore, then the dignitary 
harms of the kind intended by discriminating merchants are of a most 
serious nature. They injure not merely the individual person that has 
been unjustly excluded, but also weaken the wider certitude that 
there do exist fundamental and inviolable rights that must be 
respected by both state and other persons. The coherence of the 
merchant’s claim to a right to religious liberty rests upon the prior 
acceptance that each individual possesses an intrinsic dignity from 
which subsidiary rights, such as those of religious exercise, flow. 
Everyone who possesses that intrinsic dignity, including gay men 
and lesbians, has a right of free access to public accommodations, 
and should be allowed to trade for advertised services without 
hindrance. 
Granting that dignitary injuries should not be underestimated, 
some writers have suggested one way by which these harms can be 
avoided while still allowing the shop to exercise a right to exclude. 
As a condition to claim a privilege to discriminate, businesses must 
provide prior notice as to the kinds of services they will refuse, and 
to which people. For example, Masterpiece would be permitted to 
exclude gay customers if it first posted a sign on the door that it does 
not provide cakes to same-sex couples. 
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, in reaction to Dale, suggests that in the 
context of membership organizations, states should require these 
groups to publicize their discriminatory policies as the price for 
exemption from antidiscrimination laws.316 Her arguments easily 
extend to commercial enterprises. If, as the owners say, the kinds of 
people served constitute part of a broader message by the business, 
then everyone choosing to patronize that shop is, by the owner’s 
argument, endorsing that message. Without sharing knowledge 
beforehand of the message its customers are implicitly supporting, 
314. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, pmbl. (Dec. 16, 1966). 
315. Id.
316. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Facilitating Boycotts of Discriminatory Organizations Through
an Informed Association Statute, 87 MINN. L. REV. 481, 483–84 (2002). 
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the store perpetrates “a kind of associational fraud.”317 “Permitting 
‘expressive’ associations to opt out of the public accommodations 
statute, but requiring them to do so publicly, would achieve three 
goals: promote the state’s interests in nondiscrimination, uphold the 
organizations’ right of expressive association, and protect the public 
from unknowing association with discriminatory organizations.”318 
Other commentators, like Koppelman, have echoed her 
suggestions: “Businesses that serve the public, such as wedding 
photographers, should be exempted, but only if they are willing to 
bear the cost of publicly identifying themselves as discriminating.”319 
Such a requirement was added to a proposed Oklahoma “Religious 
Freedom Act,”320 leading to its legislative defeat.321 
Not everyone, however, has applauded the idea to publicize the 
amount of prejudice within society, especially one built on a national 
myth of equality and democracy. “The cumulative expressive impact 
of such declarations may have far more serious consequences than 
the decisions of the providers themselves acting independently and 
outside of the public eye.”322 Especially problematic would be Lim 
and Melling’s suggestion that posting such signs may cut against the 
argument of the dignitary harms they are designed to alleviate.323 If 
those injuries are the primary concern, then such signs may be a 
counterproductive solution. The difficulty appears in the externalities 
associated with openly allowing group-based discrimination. In 
addition to the harm done to the specific targets, society itself incurs 
the costs of reduced cohesiveness among its citizens, more fear and 
suspicion between groups, and less commitment to the foundational 
ideals that were intended to unite a population that does not share 
race, religion, ethnic background, or even language. 
317. Id. at 482.
318. Id. at 496–97.
319. Gay Rights, supra note 79, at 620.
320. H.B. 1371, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015), http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/cf_pdf
/2015-16%20INT/hB/HB1371%20INT.pdf. 
321. David Hudson, ‘Religious Freedom’ Bill Ditched After Amendment Is Added to Prevent
Gay Couples Being Humiliated, GAY STAR NEWS (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.gaystarnews.com 
/article/%E2%80%98religious-freedom%E2%80%99-bill-ditched-after-amendment-added 
-prevent-gay-couples-being-humiliated1.
322. Brownstein, supra note 280, at 434.
323. Lim & Melling, supra note 288, at 722 (“Even accepting the assertion that
‘Heterosexuals Only’ signs would not crop up across many segments of the country, the question 
remains: why should this be acceptable anywhere, even where motivated by religious belief?”). 
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The merchants’ exercise of their religious rights, even if 
reasonable when considered in isolation, appears excessive when 
factoring in the externalized costs imposed upon everyone else, much 
like a polluting factory in a residential neighborhood. “Beyond the 
humiliation and degradation of such actions, allowing this 
discrimination opens the door, legally and morally, to larger acts of 
discrimination against LGBT people—and other people—for 
purported religious reasons.”324 Merchants seek to use their religious 
freedom to undermine the human dignity of others, without which 
there is little basis to deem religious freedom a right at all. 
VI. THE BALANCE OF COMPETING BURDENS
No easy answer is available when seeking to balance the injuries 
alleged to arise from either enforcing or circumventing 
nondiscrimination laws. According to the account offered here, 
religious objectors have a sincere belief that same-sex marriage is 
sinful, and that they must not offer support to same-sex marriages. 
On the other side, allowing the dignitary harm to go unchecked 
inflicts serious injury to the person denied access to public 
accommodations, and threatens the intelligibility of the idea of 
fundamental rights, including the right to religious exercise. 
Two arguments favor defendants like Masterpiece, Sweet Cakes, 
and Elane Photography when they insist that the injury inflicted by a 
demand to serve contrary to their religious beliefs outweighs any 
benefit to the same-sex couples. First, if all goes as the law says it 
ordinarily should—the customer enters the shop, receives service, 
and leaves—the customer will be unaware that anything unusual has 
happened. But the shopkeeper will be keenly aware of the dynamics 
at play. In this sense, then, the resentment within the merchant will 
prove more burdensome than the unperturbed enjoyment of the 
consumer. Second, as discussed earlier, the endowment effect
suggests that losses are always valued more highly than gains. Even 
should the customer become aware of the underlying conflict, 
common expectations suggest that the perceived transgression of 
religious identity and property right to exclude will be more dearly 
valued than a newly acquired ability to enter a shop that previously 
324. SIGNORILE, supra note 93, at 32.
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denied services to gays.325 Both seem to support a conclusion that the 
burden is greater for the merchant than for the couple, and that the 
exemption should be granted. 
The plaintiff couples have their own arguments to bring forward. 
They may assert a principle that when multiple rights are in conflict 
the court should favor the more fundamental liberty whose injury 
would have a wider ripple effect than that from infringing a less 
basic right. Courts generally avoid ranking rights, but some hierarchy 
certainly exists. The right to life, for example, necessarily precedes a 
right to education, and any conflict between them should be resolved 
in favor of the former. Similarly, religious liberties presuppose an 
intact respect for human dignity, and therefore they cannot be 
preserved against an attack upon that foundation. 
We should also favor those exercises of rights that 
unintentionally conflict with another’s liberties over those actions 
that overtly frustrate the rights of another. Same-sex couples do not 
enter bakeries for the purpose of placing the owner in a difficult 
situation. This is an accidental outcome arising from their primary 
purpose of obtaining a wedding cake from a public merchant. The 
merchant, however, when he denies a couple the right of free access, 
has specifically targeted the victims “because of” their sexual 
orientation. This imbalance of intentions favors the customers. The 
party that deliberately, rather than incidentally, obstructs the exercise 
of a fundamental liberty cannot then claim to have incurred the 
greater harm. 
Although I believe that the long-term interests of society are 
better served by enforcing nondiscrimination laws in the public 
marketplace even against sincere religious beliefs, however the 
question is decided, the result will alienate some faction of the 
citizenry. Pragmatists will continue to offer compromise solutions 
that purport to respect the most important concerns of each side. The
posting of signs announcing discriminatory intent offers one such 
possibility, but may prove to have unintended consequences. Another 
325. Although phrased here for convenience, this statement is not a technically accurate
description of the possible role of the endowment effect, which looks to losses and gains of the 
same good rather than, as here, comparative enjoyments of different goods or rights. The more 
formal comparison would look to the value of the breached liberty to the party that experiences its 
loss, with the value assigned to the other party for receiving the benefits of the breach. Since each 
side of the debate sees itself as having a right that is being threatened (e.g., the right of free access 
vs. the right to exclude), complete analysis would involve multiple findings of relative values. 
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that is sometimes offered suggests that governmental regulation of 
bigotry is entirely the wrong approach. Granting that everyone 
should be able to enter the marketplace without fear of irrational 
prejudice, the position posits that government sanctions are an 
inappropriate tool to remedy the evil of discrimination. Instead, 
market forces will punish bigots when their more fair-minded 
customers refuse to do business with them. 
Two observations render this scenario unlikely. First, it too 
easily dismisses the price exacted from specific gay couples in favor 
of abstract business interests. Real people should not endure an 
avoidable but irremediable injury—there is only one wedding, and 
the fear of discrimination in an ostensibly open marketplace will be 
lingering—in the hope that eventually, perhaps long after their 
deaths, society will inch toward a more tolerant view of its members. 
That seems unfair, especially when other means exist to lighten the 
demand upon people experiencing discrimination today. Second, 
reliance upon market forces assumes without justification that there 
will always be sufficient people of good will to impact the market in 
the way described. Yet when the antigay pizzeria expressed its intent 
to discriminate against gay couples, although it did suffer a 
short-term economic penalty, in the end the owners received a 
greater reward of $842,387 from supporters.326 “[T]he idea that the 
market controls all invidious discrimination is, and always has been, 
demonstrably false. The market responds to the attitudes of 
customers,”327 and if those customers applaud the discriminatory 
actions, we will in fact see more of them unless an external force 
such as governmental regulation intervenes. 
A more feasible and pragmatic compromise allows the 
possibility that a small number of service providers will fall into the 
category of artisans that Elane Photography attempted to carve out 
for itself. If the contracted service falls within the class of artistic 
326. Lawrence Billy Jones III, supra note 81; Valerie Beaumont, Indiana Pizza Shop Is First
to Publicly Deny Same-Sex Service: Thanks, Religious Freedom, ADDICTING INFO (Apr. 1, 2015, 
8:25 AM), http://www.addictinginfo.org/2015/04/01/indiana-pizza-shop-is-first-to-publicly-deny 
-same-sex-service-thanks-religious-freedom-video; see, e.g., Help Sweetcakes by Melissa,
CONTINUE TO GIVE, https://www.continuetogive.com/4811392 (last visited Oct. 4, 2015) (Also
benefited from a funding campaign in excess of $200,000. Antigay bigotry is proving to be a
lucrative business strategy, suggesting that relying upon market forces to rein in such
undemocratic tendencies may not be prudent.).
327. We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here, supra note 71, at 937.
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expression, then its activities would garner a higher degree of 
constitutional protection than would the mere provision of for-hire 
services. The New Mexico Supreme Court, however, resisted taking 
this step, saying that “[w]e decline to draw the line between 
‘creative’ or ‘expressive’ professions and all others . . . Courts cannot 
be in the business of deciding which businesses are sufficiently 
artistic to warrant exemptions from antidiscrimination laws.”328 
In this, though, the court overstates the situation. Although the 
Elane Photography court hesitated to venture into this determination, 
judges have been doing something similar for a long time. “The Free 
Press Clause of the Constitution protects a newspaper against 
demands that it comply with nondiscrimination ordinances and 
thereby publish same-sex union announcements when such 
compliance undermines the editorial autonomy of the newspaper.”329 
The finding of editorial judgment flows from the presence of choices 
“made independently, oriented to the audience’s needs as well as 
preferences.”330 We need not argue an analogy between the editorial 
judgments of newspapers and bakers. The Elane Photography court 
takes that step itself when it labels what she does as “editorial 
judgment.”331 While the nondiscrimination law is not requiring that 
the photographer speak the government’s message in the manner of 
Barnette, it arguably might rise to interference on the level of 
Tornillo. In that case it was found that if the newspapers had to print 
the political candidate’s reply message, the impact on the paper 
would appear in several ways, including censuring itself in by 
refusing to offer negative editorials, and shouldering the additional 
costs to add additional pages to its publication. While I do not expect 
that Elane Photography could meet this threshold showing of 
editorial judgment within its ordinary taking of wedding 
photographs, other wedding service providers might. 
In such instances we can imagine a court finding a shop to be 
shielded from nondiscrimination laws when the offered service 
entails significant, nontrivial, and necessary judgments as an exercise 
of professional expertise. A baker who offers established options 
328. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 71 (N.M. 2013).
329. James M. Donovan, Same-Sex Union Announcements: Whether Newspapers Must
Publish Them, and Why We Should Care, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 721, 772 (2003). 
330. Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment, 78 NEB. L. REV. 754,
830 (1999). 
331. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 67.
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(e.g., number of cake tiers, flavors) would receive less exemption 
from antidiscrimination law than one who offers individualized 
nonstandard personal services. Applying this standard to the list of 
service providers that have already expressed a preference to 
discriminate (bakers, photographers, venues, dress shops, florists, 
print shops, planners), only wedding planners appear well positioned 
to expect deference in this matter.332 If a dressmaker designs and 
individually tailors the outfit rather than working from patterns, she 
too may fall within this narrow exception. While offering a safe 
harbor to only the most creative and artistic of providers will not 
satisfy those who demand blanket permission to discriminate, it 
would offer a principled response that takes seriously the stated 
reasons for the desired exemption. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
With the announcement of a constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage in Obergefell, one of the next confrontations in the struggle 
for expanded equality will involve the demand for religious 
exemptions from nondiscrimination laws in the public marketplace. 
According to a recent poll, 59 percent of those responding believe 
businesses should be allowed to refuse selling to gay couples 
332. According to Wikipedia, the duties of the wedding planner include the following, many
of which require nonroutine responsibilities and the exercise of professional judgment 
orchestrating the event: 
• Interviewing the couple and the parents to identify their needs
• Budget preparation
• Event design and styling
• Venues scouting
• Planning detailed checklist (from about a year in advance to a few days after
the wedding)
• Attendee list preparation
• Identification of event venues (hotels, wedding manor etc.)
• Identifying and hiring of wedding professionals and service providers
(caterers, photographers, videographers, beautician, florists, bakers etc.), and
preparation and execution of contracts
• Procurement of customized decorations such as a journey map
• Coordination of deliveries/services on the wedding day
• Have a back-up plan in the event of a disaster
• Manages the schedule, often with software
• Assist and prepare legal documentation and translations—especially for
destination weddings
Wedding Planner, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wedding_planner (last visited Mar. 
29, 2016). 
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planning a wedding.333 The present discussion has attempted to 
unravel the eclectic arguments that are repeatedly offered in support 
of such an exemption. The initial feint invokes a fundamental right to 
exclude. If successful, the asserted right removes the special animus 
of targeting gays and frames the exemption as one narrowly tailored 
to respond only to same-sex marriages. The strategy fails for two 
reasons. First, the right to exclude is a fundamentally racist rule 
devised to prevent African Americans from participating in free 
society. Rather than attempt to revive it in order to likewise bar gay 
men and lesbians from the marketplace, the rule should be reset to 
the antebellum standard of free access to all public places of 
commerce. A second ploy attempts the appearance of a reasonable 
compromise by offering assurances that the discrimination will target 
only marrying gays and not all of them. Unfortunately, those wishing 
an exemption from nondiscrimination laws will need to rely upon the 
naked legal precedents unembellished by rhetorical stratagems that 
minimize the enormity of what is being asked. 
The principle legal conclusions are twofold. First, although free 
speech defenses have been easily rebuffed, the possibility of a 
coerced speech defense that has been contextualized to the receiving 
audience and read against the background social norms should be 
recognized. Messages arise when actions cut against stereotyped 
expectations as they currently stand. To evaluate a forced speech 
claim we must know what are the routine understandings of 
same-sex marriage within the relevant community. Only then can a 
court ascertain whether the service provider has been asked to send a 
message about same-sex marriage against its will. 
The free exercise claim presents a less likely chance of success, 
especially in states without a RFRA law. In those settings the court 
will analyze the religious exercise argument under the Smith criteria, 
which invariably find the contested nondiscrimination law to be of 
general applicability. In jurisdictions that have enacted a local 
version of RFRA, it is unclear how judges will assess the 
government’s compelling interest to prevent sexual orientation 
discrimination. That analysis will involve a description of the harms 
threatening both sides of the conflict. While the injuries arising from 
333. David Crary & Emily Swanson, AP-GfK Poll: Sharp Divisions After High Court Backs
Gay Marriage, AP-GFK POLL (July 18, 2015), http://ap-gfkpoll.com/featured/findings-from-our 
-latest-poll-22.
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the violation of sincerely held religious beliefs are to be assumed, the 
dignitary harms to the same-sex couple should not be 
mischaracterized and trivialized as a “minor inconvenience.” 
Because the injuries to the customer are likely to spread wider 
throughout society than the burdens on the private religious beliefs of 
the owners, my own judgment is that social interests are better served 
by enforcement of the nondiscrimination laws than by granting 
piecemeal exceptions that will tend to devalorize the conviction that 
all citizens merit equal respect in the public square. 
For those that do insist on concessions to the demand for 
religious exceptions, the most defensible compromise approach may 
carve out a small group of professionals who exercise “editorial 
judgment” in the same manner as the courts have described for 
newspapers. While most providers of wedding services will fail to 
meet this bar, its existence would embody the most substantive 
objections to the requirement to obey the law, and demonstrate that 
those complaints have been heard and acted upon in good faith to the 
greatest extent possible without infringing on the rights of all others 
to enter freely and without fear into the marketplace. 
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